A note on determiners, obviation, and opacity

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Chomsky (1982), among others, suggests that Condition C of the Binding Theory to account for obviation effects may be entirely eliminated. In this note, I discuss extenssively data from Galician which supports this view. I show in particular that the relevant data are more complex than is usually assumed¹.

1. Determined vs. Open Nominals

Like many other languages, Galician has two ways of introducing nominal expressions, including names: by way of a bare nominal (e.g. Xan) or a nominal specified by a determiner (e.g. o Xan). Let me call the first type O(pen)-nominals, and the second type D(etermined)-nominals. Alvarez, Regueira, and Monteagudo (1986) indicate that the second option entails "familiarity" with the person we are naming. While this is certainly true, a more subtle distinction between these two types of nominals is at play. Imagine you pass by an office whose door bears the name *Carballeira*. You have no idea who this person is; but you see a line of angry people waiting, presumably for him... You realize he is in trouble, and to express this thought you say (1a)—but you could not have said (1b)²:

(1) a. Carballeira vai dado Carballeira goes given 'Carballeria is in trouble' b. *o Carballeira vai dado the Carballeira goes given

This fact indicates that whereas *Carballeira* may have an attributive reading, o *Carballeira* has only a referential reading³.

(1) Condition C stipulates that names must be free, where free means "not-bound", and α binds β iff α c-commands and is co-indexed with β . For the relevant discussion and references see for instance Lasnik and Uriagereka (1988).

(2) This expression is not to be confused with o tal Carballeira, 'the such Carballeira', which means essentially "the one who bears the name Carballeira".

(3) For the relevant discussion, see Donnellan (1966), Kripke (1972), among several others more recently. For the specific issue of the attributive use of proper names, see Devitt (1974) and Boër (1978). See also Rivero (1979) for discussion of these issues within the Romance languages. Note that the constrast just introduced indicates that we must be able to treat names as predicates, much like nouns. In turn, when a determiner is not used, it is plausible that *any* possible reading for the nominal expression is available, not just an attributive one. In other words, it could be that there are intensional readings other than an attributive one available to such names. Since the issue is not relevant to my presentation, I will simply put it aside and use the terms "intensional" and "attributive" interchangeably.

[ASJU Geh 14-2, 1991, 947-958] http://www.ehu.es/ojs/index.php/asju Consider next the following paradigm:

- (2) a. *cadaquén colleu o seu (porco)* eachwho grabbed the his pig 'each one grabbed his own pig'
 - b. *cadaquén colleu seu* (porco) eachwho grabbed his pig 'each one grabbed one separate pig'

Seu in (1b) gets a variable interpretation, ranging over the individuals grabbing, say, pigs: Xan gets one, Farruco another one, et cetera. O seu (porco) in (1a) gets a referential interpretation: Xan got his piglet Quiniña, and Farruco his boar Quino, and so on. Consider also the contrasts in (3):

- (3) a. esta é a cadela, que o seu, amigo fireu e, this is the dog that the her friend hurt
 - b. *esta é a cadela; que seu; amigo fireu e;

Both of these appear at first sight as instances of Weak Crossover. (That is, roughly, structures where a trace is coindexed with a non c-commanding pronoun to its left)⁴. Yet an important assimetry arises: in fact, o seu does not invoke a Weak Crossover effect, it is (bare) seu that does.

One possible analysis of these facts is as follows. As I said, *seu* x means essentially "whichever x corresponds to him", whereas *o seu* x means "the x such that this x has the property of being 'of his'". In other words, in *seu* x, *seu* acts as a determiner specifying which x we are talking about (which yields an attributive reading)⁵; whereas in *o seu* x (a referential NP), it is *o* which specifies the x under consideration—all that *seu* does is tell us a property of such an x. In short, *seu* in this instance is not a determiner, but an adjective modifying x. It is plausible that, however the Weak Crossover effect is stated, it is *not* a condition on the relation between adjectives and other expressions. If this is so, the relevant conditions would have nothing to say about *seu* in (3a), where thiselement is an adjective (modifying *amigo*). But of course, *seu* in (3b) is *not* an adjective. Then, this example would indeed be an instance of a Weak Crossover effect, ceteris paribus⁶.

(4) The generalization is much more complex. For discussion and analyses which go back to Postal (1971), see Higginbotham (1980), Koopman and Sportiche (1982), Chomsky (1982), Häik (1983), Reinhart (1983), May (1985), Lasnik and Uriagereka (1988), Stowell (1988), among others. I return to this issue below.

(5) It is interesting that set x actually forces an attributive reading. This is unlike what we saw for names: the absence of a determiner *allows* an attributive reading in such an instance. It is possible that the relevant distinction has to do with definiteness; thus, (i) seems better than (7b):

(i) ??este é o rapaz que seu pai firéu this is the kid that his father hurt

That is, it appears that it is only when an NP is definite that, if it is not introduced by a determiner, it still can have a referential reading. I must note at this point that for some people (7b) is better than it is for me; this would be expected if these speakers do allow a referential reading for an expression such as *seu amigo* in that context.

(6) It seems possible to extend this analysis to languages, like English, which do not introduce names or possesive NPs by way of a determiner. This is assuming that when *his* x in English is taken attributively,

One difficulty for the analysis, however, is why (4) is out:

- (4) a. *qué cadela; [pro; [fireu e;] [seu; amigo];] what dog hurt his friend
 - b. *qué cadela_i [pro_j [fireu e_i] [o seu_i amigo] _j] what dog hurt the his friend

The ungrammaticality of (4a), involving *seu amigo*, can be explained in terms of the condition preventing Weak Crossover. The problem is the ungrammaticality of (4b), involving *o seu amigo*, where by hypothesis *seu* is an adjective. Although there is an increase in grammaticality from (4a) to (4b) (to which I return), the latter example is far from perfect. Consider (5) vis-à-vis (4)⁷:

- (5) a. *a qué cadela_i [pro_j [a fireu e_i] [seu_i amigo]_j] a what dog her hurt his friend
 - b. a qué cadela_i [pro_j [a fireu e_i] [o seu_i amigo]_j] to what dog her hurt the his friend

When we use a clitic to double the extracted phrase, (5a), a version of (4a), is still out, whereas (5b), a version of (4b), is now fine. This suggests that the ungrammaticality of (4b) is independent of Weak Crossover; I will not pursue this here⁸.

2. Determiners and Obviation

It seems to me a remarcable fact that (6) is good in Galician only if the second occurence of *Narciso* is *not* determined (i.e., is an O-nominal):

it has a different categorial structure than when it is taken referentially. This makes the prediction that (i) is not a Weak Crossover effect only if *his lover* is interpreted referentially:

(i) Mike is the guy who his lover (always) hated

Indeed, it does not seem that (i) can mean "Mike is the guy such that whoever is his lover (always) hated him".

(7) A version of (5) without an overt clitic shows the same contrasts. I will assume, following Torrego (1988), that whenever a direct object is introduced by a, it must double an either overt or empty clitic.

(8) A simplistic approach would say that the reason why the example in (5b) is fine is because the clitic (at first sight a variable) c-commands the co-indexed specifier of the inverted subject (and thus a Weak Crossover effect is not invoked). This, of course, still would not explain why (5a) is out. Also, consider (i):

- (i) a qué cadela_i querías...
 - to what dog wanted-you
 - a. ...? * [que [seu; amigo a_i ferira e_i] b. ... [que [o seu; amigo $[a_i$ ferira e_i] that her friend her hurted that the her friend her hurt

Here, the clitic does not c-command the subject —which does not need to be inverted. Still the (b) example is fine, and the (a) one is impossible. It is possible that the real issue could reduce to what counts as a discourse licenser for a definite article. Two possibilities arise: (i) it has an antecedent in the context; (ii) it introduces a definite description. Given (i), it is clear that only a relative clause provides a value for a determiner co-indexed to the relative operator; namely, the head of the relative clause. For (ii), one may conjecture also that whereas a relative-clause is specific enough to allow a definite description, a question is not. In this respect, (5b) is particularly interesting vis-à-vis (4b). It would seem as if apart from their obvious syntactic differences, these two sentences also differed semantically. The intuition is that (5b)

(6) (o) Narciso só quere a (*o) Narciso the Narciso only loves to the Narciso

In comparison, (7) is out regardless of that fact:

(7) *(0) Narciso só metóu a (0) Narciso the Narciso only killed to the Narciso

It seems clear that the relevant difference between (7) and (6) lies on the nature of the verb in each structure. Whereas *matar* 'kill' is an eventive verb, *querer* 'love' is not. In fact, (7) can be significantly improved as in (8), by means of a modal:

(8) (?) Narciso só pode matar a Narciso Narciso only can kill Narciso

In (8), Narciso is not a participant in an event, but rather the subject of the state of being able to kill Narciso. Intuively, a verb like matar 'kill' forces us to consider Narciso as a thing in the universe, whereas a verb lique querer 'love' may allow us to consider Narciso as a set of properties, different in effect from Narciso as a thing. That is, we may conceive of our loving an individual as loving the set of properties of that individual (or a number of those); but when we kill an individual, we clearly do not kill its properties, but *the* individual. Thus, note the contrasts in (9):

> (9) a. a maffia odiaba ao presidente, mais non a Kennedy the maffia hated the president but not Kennedy
> b. a maffia matóu ao presidente, mais non a Kennedy the maffia killed the president but not Kennedy

Assuming the time is 1963 and the place the USA, (9b) does not make any sense, because one cannot kill the president of the USA in 1963 without killing Kennedy—though one can hate the president without hating Kennedy, since one can hate Kennedy as a president and not, say, as a neighbor⁹.

One expects that eventive verbs demand (at some level) that their object have a referential reading. But, first, it is hard to know where this requirement would be instantiated. In light of (9b), all that we can conclude is that asserting that the maffia killed the president *entails* that the maffia killed Kennedy. Second, it simply is not true that an eventive verb selects a direct object with a referential reading. Thus:

(10) a maffia consideron matar ao presidente dos USA the maffia considered killing the president of-the USA

involves some sort of Left-dislocation, which has the semantic import of assigning a value to the clitic —perhaps as "the female that we are talking about". See Lasnik and Stowell (forthcoming) for important related discussion.

^{(9) (9}b') can be improved drastically if the adverb intentionally is added to kill, as in (i):

⁽i) Oswald killed intentionally the president, but he did not kill Kennedy intentionally

But this does not change the eventive nature of kill; thus, (ii) is still non-sensical: (ii) Oswald killed intentionally the president. but he did not kill Kennedy

Intentionally or not, if Oswald kills the president, then Oswald kills Kennedy.

This sentence has clearly two readings: the maffia could be considering the assassination of whoever is president of the USA (as in a coup), or they could be considering the assassination of, in particular, Kennedy (as in a vendetta). In both instances, the entailment (for the relevant time/space) is that Kennedy is who they consider killing. But we have to allow a verb like 'kill' to select for 'the president of the USA' with the structure permitting an attributive reading¹⁰.

In light of the contrasts in (6), a descriptive generalization roughly along the lines of (11) emerges directly:

(11) if a is a D-nominal, a is free

The interest of (7) vis-à-vis (6) is: The former indicates that (11) may be semantic in nature. A priori, *Narciso* could have in (7) the same syntactic structure that allows it to exist in (6). But suppose (11) holds in some form of the semantics —in particular, wherever entailments are encoded. As we saw above, there will be at that level an entailment of the sort: "o Narciso matou ao Narciso [the Narciso killed the Narciso]". At this level, a condition in terms of (11) would rule out (7) straigthforwardly. (6) would still be alowed, since in the latter there is no entailment that anyone loves, in particular, o Narciso.

In turn, compare (12) to (6):

(12) (ao presidente dos USA) pro matouno a maffia the president of-the USA killed-him the maffia '(the president of the USA,) the maffia killed him'

(12) cannot have a reading where 'the president of the USA' is an attributive NP: the clitic o 'him' forces a specific referential reading for that expression¹¹. This can be expressed in the terms of Torrego (1988):

(13) [ao presidente dos USA]; pro matou [o; [pro;]] a maffia

For her, a clitic is nothing but a definite article licensing an empty pronominal NP. If this approach is correct, we may be dealing here with a D-nominal as well. Then, the ungrammaticality of (14) reduces to that of the examples we have seen so far:

> (14) *(a(o) Narciso) Narciso; matou-no; to-the Narciso Narciso killed-him

(14) is usually assumed to violate a version of Condition B of the Binding Theory¹²:

(10) I am going to take this quite literally, since I have been arguing that the relevant distinctions are represented categorially —at least in Galician.

(11) It is the specificity/definiteness of pronominals that first lead Postal (1969) to treat these elements as determiners, which as is shown in Torrego (1988) provides a very elegant analysis of clitics in Spanish.

(12) For binding defined as in fn.1. The details of the notion Local Domain are not relevant now —though I return shortly to this matter. (See Lasnik and Uriagereka 1988 for extensive discussion.) An interesting issue arises with respect to the nature of clitics (whether or not they are pronominal) vis-à-vis (15). I am going to avoid this here assuming that, at the relevant level and with respect to Binding Theory, true pronominals have essentially the same properties of clitics. In fact, Postal was making his argument that pronominals are definite articles (see fn. 11) not with respect to clitics (though he strongly suggested that this was the case) but with respect to (English) pronominals.

(15) A pronominal is free in its Local Domain

For concreteness, then, I will assume that generalization (11) can follow from a generous version of (15), perhaps as in $(15')^{13}$:

(15') A D-nominal is free in its Local Domain

Needless to say, the issue of locality has to be addressed for (15') to deduce (11). I turn to this now.

3. Opacity and Obviation

As is well-known, (16a) is not a violation of Condition B, since the pronominal and its antecedent are not included in the Local Domain of the former. But if Condition C is stated as in (15'), then we are predicting that (16b) should be also possible, if all that it could violate is this condition¹⁴:

> (16) a. (o) Narciso_i pensa que só el_i é belo the Narciso thinks that only he is handsome

> > b. (o) Narciso, pensa que só (o) Narciso, é belo the Narciso thinks that only the Narciso is handsome

I think it is fair to say that (16b) is perfectly fine *even* when the determiner is used. Even though the judgement is subtle, it appears that (16b) is grammatical only when a *de dicto* reading is invoked. Thus, the consequent in (17) seems incongrous:

> (17) o Narciso, pensa que o Narciso, é belo. *Po-lo tanto, the Narciso thinks that the Narciso is handsome therefore

o Narciso pensa que o fillo de Cefiso é belo the Narciso thinks that the son of Cefiso is beautiful

Narciso might not know that Cefiso is his father. In a *de re* reading, this is irrelevant, since the speaker is using (the second occurence of) the term *Narciso* to refer to the individual (the *thing* in the universe) such that his name is Narciso, his father is Cefiso, his mother is Liriope, et cetera. In principle, such a reading is possible in an example along the lines of $(18)^{15}$:

(18) a Afrodita pensa que o Narciso é belo. Po-lo tanto, the Afrodita thinks that the Narciso is handsome therefore

a Afrodita pensa que o fillo de Cefiso é belo the Afrodita thinks that the son of Cefiso is beautiful

(13) The fact that (15') must constrain the semantics suggests that we limit its application to a post-LF level. Chomsky (1981) discussed examples of the form in (ib), assuming Quantifier Raising at LF, to motivate the need for Condition C to apply at S-structure:

(i) a. every book that John; read, he; liked b. *he; liked every book that John; read

Crucially, Chomsky was assuming that at LF (ib) looks essentially the same as (ia). I return in section 4 to examples of this sort.

(14) Lasnik (1988) discusses similar data from Vietnamese.

(15) See Cresswell (1985) for extenssive discussion of this matter.

The only difference between (18) and (17) is that in the former *Narciso* is not just the subject of being handsome, but also the subject of the thinking. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the consequent there is not coherent with the antecedent clause because the syntactic structure of the latter is forcing a *de dicto* reading for the embedded clause.

The fact, however, is not peculiar to names. Thus, (19) seems out, even when the subject of the embedded clause is a pronominal:

(19) *(0) Narciso pensa que só él [the speaker points at Narciso] é belo the Narciso thinks that only he is handsome

(Of course, the example is ungrammatical only if the speaker knows that Narciso is the individual he is pointing at.) I am not concerned here with proposing a condition to explain this description of the facts. The only point I am trying to make is that D-nominals and pronominals behave alike, even with respect to the issue of locality raised in relation to (15').

4. Antecedents and Crossover

None of the "exceptions" to Condition C that I have shown above takes place when the antecedent of the R-expression is a pronominal —a point made in Lasnik (1988) for several languages. Thus:

- (20) a. * \acute{el}_{i} só quere a Narciso_i he only loves to Narciso
 - b. *él_i pensa que só (o) Narciso_i é belo he thinks that only the Narciso is handsome

The same is true if the antecedent of the R-expression is an anaphoric epithet, which Lasnik also notes:

- (21) a. *o moi egotista; só quere a Narciso; the very egotistical only loves to Narciso
 - b. *o moi egotista; pensa que só (o) Narciso; the very egotistical thinks that only the Narciso

However, Milner (1981) notes examples of the sort in (22):

(22) Walter Scott thought that he should admire the work of Walter Scott

Under one possible interpretation of (22), *he* has the reference of *Walter Scott*—yet no ungrammaticality seems to arise here. This suggests that the problems with the examples before have to do with the pronominal (and by extension, the anaphoric epithet), rather than the name¹⁶. What Milner claims is that the pronominal in (22)

- (16) The following examples confirm Milner's insight:
 - (i) a. Walter Scott estaba moi pagado de si pro pensaba que pro debía admirar especialmente a obra de Walter Scott
 Walter Scott was very poud of self (he) thought that (he) should admire especially the work of Walter Scott

can get its reference from the higher occurence of *Walter Scott*, which c-commands this pronominal, whereas in the other cases the pronominal would have to get its reference from a lower *Walter Scott*. I return shortly to this matter.

There are two potential problems with this otherwise plausible approach. First, (23), a type of example that Milner does not discuss, is still out when an anaphoric epithet such as *o escritor* 'the writer' refers to Walter Scott (this example is suggested by a comparable one in Lasnik 1988):

(23) *Walter Scott pensaba que o escribot debía admira-la obra de Walter Scott thought that the writer should admire the work of

Walter Scott Walter Scott

Lasnik also notes that examples comparable to (24) (where *Walter Scott* does not c-command *o escritor*) are possible:

(24) un coñecido de Walter Scott decía que o escritor debía an acquaintance of Walter Scott said that the writer should admira-la obra de Walter Scott admire the work of Walter Scott

However, (25) indicates that c-command is really not at stake:

(25) o meu abó decía que Franco creía que todo dios the my grand-father used-to-say that Franco thought that everyone admiraba ao gran fillo de puta admired to-the big son of a bitch

Imagine my grandfather saying to me: that big son of a bitch, he thought that everybody admired him. Then imagine me reporting this thought: I start with my grandfather said...; the next step is naturally to introduce Franco, assuming this name is not in the context; finally, if I want to report accurately my grandfather's statement, I must qualify Franco as being "a son of a bitch". The understanding is that this epithet is not necessarily one I chose, but could be one of my grandfather's crop. Crucially, though, it is not Franco's; i.e., we may assume Franco is not the one that thought of himself as a son of a bitch. The issue seems to be, then, the following. Anaphoric epithets introduce a description. Someone has to be responsible for this description, and usually this is the speaker. When this is the case, we are invoking a dere

Walter Scott was very poud of self

B: Desde logo, pro pensaba que pro debía admirar especialmente a obra de Walter Scott Indeed (he) thought that (he) should admire especially the work of Walter Scott

- c. [The speaker is showing the listener pictures of Walter Scott]
 - (Valente egotista!) pro pensaba que pro debía admirar especialmente a obra de Walter Scott! What an egotist he thought that (he) should admire especially the work of Walter Scott

All of these —which make explicit an antecedent for the pronominal— seem perfect.

b. A: Walter Scott estaba moi pagado de si

reading for the expression in question, and the ungrammaticality that arises when the anaphoric apithet is bound reduces to that of (19) and the like. However, when we find a plausible descriptor other than the speaker, a *de dicto* reading is still possible— the instances in (25) and (24).

The other type of problem for Milner's suggestion comes from examples of the sort in (26):

(26) o seu, dono admira ao Bermello, the his owner admired the Bermello

How is it possible for *seu* to be referentially dependent on *o Bermello* in (26), if this element does not c-command *seu*?¹⁷ Suppose we take the following route. Certainly, *o Bermello* in (26) has at least the option of raising at LF—an analogue of SS topicalization. Let this movement yield (27):

(27) $[_{IP} ao Bermello_i [_{IP} o seu_i dono admira t_i]]$

Now seu has a c-commanding antecedent, and the intended coreference can arise. This makes one prediction. (26) does not invoke a Weak Crossover effect because seu here is an adjective. But if instead of o seu we had seu introducing dono, the example should get the status of Weak Crossover violations; and it does¹⁸: (19)

(28) *seu; dono admira ao Bermello;

(28) in Galician is as bad as (29):

(29) **sua nai*, *admira a todo dios*, his mother admires everyone

There is one last type of example to consider when dealing with traditional Condition C effects: Strong Crossover¹⁹:

(17) I will assume without discussion that the relation of antecedence, if defined sententially, implies c-command and that pronominals (in a non-deitic interpretation) need an antecedent—which of course can be in the discourse. See Reinhart (1983), among others, for important discussion.

(18) At least for those of us who do not accept a referential reading for seu x 'his x' (see fn. 5). Of course, a version of (29) with *o seu* 'the his' instead of *seu* 'his' is still out (cf. (4)). See fn. 8 for a possible approach to this issue. Given this, it is not all that surprising that the well-known contrast in (i) exists in a language like English:

(i) a. his; loves John Smith;

b. * his; lover loves everyone;

We may assume that *his* in (ia) is an adjective—an option which, say for the reasons adduced in fn. 8, does not arise for (ib). That is, a paraphrasis of the example in (ia) would be: "the individual identified as 'John's lover' [i.e., say, Mary Jones] loves John" (but not: "whoever is John's lover loves John"). In any case, the nominal complement of *love* in (i) would raise at LF in both instances, to provide the pronominal with an antecedent. I return shortly to why this strategy could not be used for in particular (20).

(19) One might be able to rule out (30) invoking (15'). But this solution is clearly not at play for (i), which is equally impossible:

 (i) *a quén; estaba él; esperando que María vise t; to whom was he expecting that María saw 'who was he expecting that María wold see' [with the meaning 'who was expecting that María would see him'] (30) *a quén_i está el_i vendo t_i no espello to whom is he seeing in-the mirror 'who is he seeing in the mirror' [with the meaning 'who is seeing himself']

Following an idea discussed by Stowell (1988), I will assume that the ungrammaticality of these examples reduces to that of Weak Crossover violations. The latter, no doubt, may "sound" better (at least in English); but this needs to be qualified. Thus, consider again a type of contrast seen above:

- (31) a. ? *a quén, noquea (sempre) o seu, contrincante, to whom knocks-out always the his opponent ('who does his opponent (always) knock out?']
 - b. *a quén; noquea (sempre) seu; contrincante; to whom knocks-out always his opponent

(31a) is quite bad. But (31b), which strongly favors an intensional reading of *seu* contrincante (see fns. 5 and 18), is just terrible— imagine the question is about a lousy boxer and try to force an intensional reading. Therefore, I am not worried about claiming that (31b) and (30) are two instances of a Cross-over violation, whatever that is.

One would want that an example like (20) be prevented from an analysis as in (32)—analogous to (27) (where the raised NP would serve as an antecedent for the pronominal)— in terms of the Cross-over prohibition:

(32) $*[_{IP} Narciso_i [_{IP} \acute{el}_i pensa que sólo t_i \acute{e} belo]$

Interestingly, it is the parallelism between cases like (20) and cases like (30) that lead Wasson (1972) to the insight of treating the two alike. What Wassow did is reduce the problem in (30) to that in (20): both would be Condition C violations. I am suggesting a reduction too, but the other way around: both are violations of a constraint against Cross-over. I can think of two reasons for this. One is a type of examples discussed by Higginbotham (1980):

(33) *[which picture of which man_i]; does he_i like t_i

Condition C could not say anything about this example because he does not c-command which man²⁰. The other is that once the data are cleared from interfering factors, true Cross-over violations all sound very ungrammatical. Clearly, Weak Cross-over violations cannot be reduced to a binding constraint (at least in the traditional sense of binding). Therefere, something must account for them independently; since they are as bad as Strong Cross-over violations, there is no reason to believe that the same principle could not be responsible for both.

(20) Except at D-structure. However, this does not seem to be relevant, in light of the perfect (ia), whose D-structure is (ib):

- (ii) a. John seems to himself [t to be a fool] b. e
- b. e seems to himself [John to be a fool]

5. Conclusions

In this note, I have tried to sort out the data relevant to an obviation principle such as Condition C. I showed (i) that the role of determiners (and in particular the referential/attributive distinction) appears to be quite crucial in invoking obviation effects²¹, and (ii) that obviation phenomena are off when opaque domains are at stake. I suggested that a semantic version of Condition B applying to D-nominals (so that entailments of propositions are also constrained) could give the desired results with respect to these data. I argued that Weak and Strong Crossover phenomena may follow from the same principle, which rules out a number of instances where pronominals seek an antecedent which is hierarchically lower. In as much as Condition C reduces to a version of Condition B, the former is not necessary.

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(21) This approach should possibly be extended to other languages. There are several cases to consider: languages with determiners which do not show the determiner alternation in question (e.g. English); languages without determiners which (obviously) do not show it either (like several Asian languages, iacluding Japanese, Thai, Vietnamese, Korean, et cetera); languages with determiners which *always* need a determiner to introduce a nominal expression (e.g., Catalán); and the most interesting case: languages with determiners where there is a systematic distinction (e.g., Galician). The issue appears to me to be relevant in relation to the data discussed by Lasnik (1988), where in particular some Asian languages are shown to violate Condition C in a number of instances. For example, (i), from Thai:

(i) coon; choop coon; 'John likes John'

The interesting question would be now to test whether the second ocurence of the NP has an attributive or a referential reading. If it has an attributive one, then it reduces to the same example we saw in Galician. Although I will not pursue this here, it seems that one way to proceed in order to unify these phenomena is to posit null determiners in the relevant instances. Reinhart, T., 1983, Anaphora and Semantic Interpretation, Croom Helm.

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