# Negative Complementizers: Evidence from English, Basque and Spanish 

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## 1. Inherently negative verbs: a clausal/non-clausal asymmetry.

It is a well known fact that Negative Polarity Items (henceforth NPI) can be licensed across clause boundaries without the occurrence of overt negation (Klima 1964, Ladusaw 1979, Linebarger 1980 and references therein). Some examples of this interclausal licensing are given below:
(1) a. -The witnesses denied [that anybody left the room before dinner]
b. The professor doubts [that anybody understood her explanation]

It has been usually assumed since Klima (1964) that it is the negative force of the main verbs deny and doubt that makes the embedded clause an NPI licensing domain. ${ }^{1}$ If this assumption is correct, we should expect the NPIs in (2) to be licensed as well, since they are direct objects of the same verbs deny and doubt. However, as noted by Progovac (1988), this is not the case: NPIs in object position are not licensed. These NPIs can only receive, marginally, a 'free choice' reading, ${ }^{2}$ characteristic of unlicensed NPIs (Ladusaw 1979):
(2) a. * The witnesses denied anything
b. * The professor doubts any explanation

As noted by Feldman (1985), examples like (3) clearly illustrate that this asymmetry is a fact about the structural relation between deny and its sister:
(3) I deny that the witnesses denied anything

In (3), the matrix occurrence of deny licenses the object NPI of the lower clause

[^0]deny, although the embedded clause is ungrammatical if it is not embedded, as shown in (2a).

It is this asymmetry between clausal and non-clausal arguments of 'inherently negative' verbs that will motivate the main claim of this paper. Given its central role, I will discuss it in more detail, in order to show that it holds consistently, despite occasional appearances to the contrary.

### 1.1. Three Criteria to Distinguisb licensed NPIs.

I will present here three criteria that distinguish licensed NPIs from 'free' ones. In each of them, the sentences in (1) will pattern as having licensed NPIs, whereas the sentences in (2) will pattern like instances of 'free' NPIs.
(I) The first criterion involves the adverb just. Attachment of this adverb forces a 'free choice' interpretation of the constituent headed by any. The effect induced by just can be seen in (4). Thus, compare (4a) to (4b):
(4) a. I didn't eat anything, I starved * I ate truffles
b. I didn't eat just anything, I ate truffles * I starved

In (4a), the NPI anything is licensed by negation, and thus the sentence means roughly the same as 'I ate nothing'. Hence, the appropriate continuation of this sentence is 'I starved' and not 'I ate truffles', since the latter would result in a contradiction. However, in (4b), the introduction of the adverb just induces a complete reversal in the interpretation of the sentence. Now the entailment is that I ate something out of the ordinary. This is in fact the effect that obtains by introducing just in a context where the NPI is licensed by negation. Just forces the 'free' reading of the NPI, changing the interpretation of the sentence. On the other hand, introducing just in a context where the constituent headed by any is anyway 'free choice' does not induce a change in interpretation.

Let us see what results are obtained when $j u s t$ is introduced in the examples in (1) and (2). If just is introduced in the examples in (2), the interpretation of the sentences do not change; thus, (5a) and (5b) mean the same as (2a) and (2b):
a. The witnesses denied just anything
b. The professor doubts just any explanation

If anything, the only change is that the sentences are now more acceptable. This is so because any has only a 'free choice' reading in all the examples in (2) and (5), and just makes that reading more salient.

For those speakers who do not find just particularly helpful in inducing a 'free choice' reading, there is another option that gives similar results. This is to introduce the modifier ol' after any. This particle can be inserted either alone or in combination with just, and it also has the effect of forcing a 'free choice' reading.

Notice that the sentences in (2) also become more easily acceptable if we introduce modals, and if the DP itself is modified, as in (6):
(6) a. The witnesses will deny any statement made by the defendant
b. The professor would doubt any explanation given by a student

These sentences sound less awkward than the ones in (2); but, even in these cases and maybe even against the speaker's first intuition, the any constituents still have only a 'free choice' reading. Thus, if we introduce the adverb just, the interpretation of the sentences does not change at all, a result that can only obtain if the constituent had solely a 'free choice' reading already in (7):
(7) a. The witnesses will deny just any statement made by the defendant
b. The professor would doubt just any explanation given by a student

In contrast, when we consider the sentences in (1), we find that they behave in a radically different way. Thus for instance, adding just (and/or ol') to the sentences in (1) induces a sharp change in interpretation, indicating that the NPI previous to the insertion of just was not 'free' but licensed:
(8) a. The witnesses denied that just anybody left the room before dinner
b. The professor doubts that just anybody understood the explanation

The conditions under which the sentences in (8) and (1) are true are not the same. Thus, (8a) is true even if the witnesses agree that some people left the room before dinner. Their claim is that only certain people did it. By contrast, the sentence in (1a) is true if the witnesses are claiming that absolutely nobody left the room before dinner. Similarly, in (8b), the sentence is true even if the professor believes that some of her students did understand the explanation, whereas in (1b) the professor believes that none of them did.
(II) The second criterion for distinguishing 'free' and licensed NPIs will involve substitution of the inherent negative verbs for non-negative ones. In cases of 'free' any constituents, this change has no consequences, whereas in cases of licensed NPIs it results in ungrammaticality.

Consider the sentences in (6), which are identical to those in (2) except for the fact that modals and relative clauses have been added to make them more acceptable. If the any constituent is a 'free choice' in (6), then substituting deny or doubt will have no effect on the acceptability of the any constituent, because the negative verbs play no role in licensing the presence of the any phrase. This expectation is indeed borne out.

If we replace deny and doubt with verbs that are never licensers of NPIs like repeat and believe, the sentences are still good and the NPIs have the same interpretation of 'pick any' (Vendler 1967):
(9) a. The witnesses will repeat any statement made by the defendant
b. The professor would believe any explanation given by her student

However, when this criterion is applied to the cases in (1), and we substitute repeat and believe for deny and doubt, as we did before with the sentences in (2) and (6), the results are now sharply ungrammatical: ${ }^{3}$
(10) a. * The witnesses repeated that anybody left the room before dinner
b. * The professor believes that anybody understood the explanation
(3) I follow Ladusaw's (1979) convention: "... the asterisks on sentences containing any below represent judgements about PS-any. Many have good FC-any interpretations which I will be ignoring." (Ladusaw 1979: 105)
(III) The third criterion involves NPIs that do not have a 'free choice' reading available. There are NPIs like a single $N$ which do not have a 'free' reading. Instead, they have the following two choices: if licensed by an affective element, they are interpreted as existentials, but if not licensed, they are interpreted as equivalent to 'one and only one'. The two interpretations are illustrated in (11): ${ }^{4}$
(11) a. I didn't write a single letter, I had no paper at all
\# the one for Mary
b. I wrote a single letter, \#I had no paper at all the one for Mary

Let us now substitute the any constituents in sentences (1) and (2). The prediction is that in the cases where the any is a licensed NPI, we will find the interpretation in (11a), whereas in those cases where the any phrases are not licensed, we will find the interpretation in (11b). Let us first consider the paradigm in (1). The substituted versions are given in (12):
(12) a. The witnesses denied that a single person left the room before dinner
b. The professor doubts that a single student understood her explanation

The sentences in (12) have roughly the same interpretation as the ones in (1). This shows that the NPI a single $N$ is indeed licensed in the embedded clause.

By contrast, when we consider the sentences in (2) under this criterion, the effects are the opposite. I will use the sentences in (6) to give these sentences the best chance, given that some speakers find the sentences in (2) already quite marginal. Consider now the cases in (13):
(13) a. The witnesses will deny a single statement made by the defendant
b. The professor would/can doubt a single explanation given by her students

The sentences in (13) have only one interpretation: in the case of (13a), there is only one particular statement the defendant will make, which the witnesses will deny. In the case of (13b), there is one particular explanation the professor will doubt. Hence, (13a) could be followed up with 'namely, the statement about her being in the kitchen during the shooting', and, similarly, (13b) could be continued with 'namely, the one about the bus catching fire on the road'. Note that no matter what intonation is given to the sentence, the NPI reading is simply not available in these cases.

We can therefore conclude that the asymmetry illustrated in (1) and (2) exists in English: NPIs are licensed only in clausal complements of 'inherent negative' lexical items. In what follows, I will be concerned with NPI cases of the sort in (1), where the interpretation of the NPI is that of an existential under the scope of negation. I will mark as deviant $\left(^{*}\right.$ ) all instances of non-licensed NPIs like the ones in (2), regardless of whether they acquire a 'free choice' interpretation or not. The asterisk
(4) The readings are facilitated if given a particular intonation contour. However, as we shall see in examples in (12), intonation cannot salvage cases where a single $N$ is not licensed at S -structure. Hence, I assume that intonation contours are derived from particular S-structure representations, and thus they are not the determining factor in licensing, but a phonetic signal that licensing has taken place.
thus means that the NPI is not licensed by negation, not necessarily that the sentence cannot have any interpretation at all.

Given the evidence just presented, we must conclude that there is a sharp contrast between clausal and non-clausal arguments of what are called 'negative verbs'. It is only in clausal arguments that NPIs are licensed by negation. NPIs are not licensed in non-clausal arguments. ${ }^{5}$ However, these results are very puzzling if it is true that the NPIs in the clausal arguments of these verbs are licensed by the 'inherent negation' of the main verb. If this is the case, there is no way to account for the clausal/non-clausal asymmetry with respect to NPI licensing.

### 1.2. No asymmetry induced by overt negation.

Note further that this asymmetry does not appear in cases where an overt negation licenses NPIs across a clause boundary. Consider the examples in (14):
(14) a. The witnesses didn't say that anybody left the room before dinner
b. The witnesses didn't say anything

If we apply the two tests we used above to distinguish 'licensed NPIs' from 'free NPIs', the results are that there is no clausal/non-clausal asymmetry in (14).
(I) Hence, if just is introduced, the meaning of both sentences changes:
(15) a. The witnesses didn't say that just anybody left the room before dinner b. The witnesses didn't say just anything
(II) And if the negation is eliminated, both sentences yield ungrammaticality: ${ }^{6}$
(16) a. * The witnesses said that anybody left the room before dinner
b. * The witnesses said anything
(III) If we substitute the any NPI for a single $N$, no radical change in interpretation is obtained, as illustrated in (17):
(17) a. The witnesses didn't say that a single person left the room before dinner
b. The witnesses didn't say a single thing
(17a) can be interpreted as meaning the same as (14a). It also has another interpretation, namely 'the witnesses did not say that only one person left the room', but this is not relevant here. As far as the present arguments goes, it is enough to show that a meaning equivalent to (14a) is available for (17a). Similarly, (17b) has a meaning equivalent to (14b).

Given this evidence, we must conclude that there are fundamental differences between the NPI licensing properties of an overt negative morpheme and those of an
(5) See below for a discussion on the status of action nouns like damage, involvement or allegation in examples like:
(i) The bumper prevented any damage to the car
(ii) The witness denied any involvement in the crime
(iii) The senator denied any allegations of child abuse
(6) Again, like in all cases of NPIs that are not licensed, a very heavy stress can rescue the sentence, but only in the 'free choice' interpretation, which is not the one at stake here.
inherent negative lexical element. Namely, whereas an overt negative marker does not discriminate between clausal and non-clausal complements in its ability to license NPIs, inherently negative lexical items do discriminate between these two types of arguments with regard to NPI licensing.

This result is unexpected if the negation in the inherently negative items is active for NPI licensing; both overt negation and this inherent negative feature should have the same licensing properties.

### 1.3. Some tough cases: action nouns.

There are some cases where the generalization presented above might seem to break down. All these cases involve action nouns. Some examples are given in (18):
(18) a. The bumper prevented any damage to the car
b. The witness denied any involvement in the crime
c. She dispelled any doubts we had
d. He refused any medication
e. The senator denied any allegations of drug-trafficking

These cases do sound like NPI any to some native speakers. However, important differences can be pointed out that clearly show otherwise. Here, I will present a fourth criterion that distinguishes 'free choice' any constituents from NPI ones; this criterion follows the spirit of Ladusaw (1979): 'free choice' any is a universal quantifier, but NPI any is an existential.

This fourth criterion involves putting all where we had any. If the any DP is a 'free choice', this change does not alter the conditions under which the sentence is true. However, if the DP headed by any is an NPI, the conditions under which the sentence is true do change significantly. In order to illustrate this, let us consider uncontroversial cases of both 'free choice' any and NPI any. Let us start with the former; consider (19):

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text { a. any dog can bite } & \text { b. any store would be cheaper than this one }  \tag{19}\\
\text { c. all dogs can bite } & \text { d. all stores would be cheaper than this one }
\end{array}
$$

The sentences in (19a, c) and (19c, d) mean almost the same: ${ }^{7}$ if any dog can bite, then it must be true that all dogs can bite, and vice versa. Similarly, it is a necessary truth that any store would be cheaper than this one if and only if all stores are cheaper than this one. It is a sufficient condition for any to be a 'free choice' (rather than an NPI) that the substitution of all preserves truth conditions. If the substitution is possible, the any at stake is a 'free choice'.

Consider now sentences with NPI any, like the ones in (20):

[^1](20) a. I did not see any dog
b. Did any store give you a lower price?
c. Never did any senator say anything like that before
d. If any human being were to enter this room...

If we now introduce all where we had any, the meaning of the sentences change considerably: (20a) could be false at the same time that (21a) is true, for instance if I have seen some dogs but not all of them. Similarly, one could answer 'yes' to (20b) and 'no' to (21b) being entirely truthful, and the same is true for the remaining cases.
(21) a. I did not see all dogs
b. Did all stores give you a lower price?
c. Never did all senators say anything like that
d. If all human beings were to enter this room...

This confirms that there is an observable difference between NPIs and 'free choice' anys regarding their existential and universal quantificational force, respectively. We can now make the substitution in the apparently problematic cases in (18), in order to determine whether these cases are truly exceptions to the generalization that inherent negative verbs do not license NPIs in non-clausal complements. Hence, consider (22):
(22) a. The bumper prevented all damage to the car
b. The witness denied all involvement in the crime
c. She dispelled all doubts we had
d. He refused all medication
e. The senator denied all allegations of drug-trafficking

There is no possible scenario where any of the sentences in (22) could be true and its correlate in (18) false, or vice versa. Thus for instance, if it is true that the bumper prevented all damage to the car, then it is necessarily true that the bumper prevented any damage to the car. Similarly, if the witness denied all involvement in the crime, she denied any involvement in the crime as well, and if she dispelled all doubts we had, then it is also true that she dispelled any doubts we had. Hence, we can conclude that all sentences in (22) entail their correlates in (18). Crucially, however, the entailment from all to any does not hold in cases of NPI any; the sentences in (21) do not entail the sentences in (20). Therefore, the examples in (18) are cases of 'free choice' any. ${ }^{8}$ They do not constitute counterevidence to the claim that negative verbs do not license NPIs in non-clausal complements.
(8) This result is further confirmed by cross-linguistic evidence. Progovac (1988) provides evidence from SerboCroatian, where NPIs do not have a free-choice reading available. Object NPIs always yield ungrammaticality in negative environments, as shown in (i):

$$
\begin{array}{ll}
\text { (i) } \begin{array}{ll}
\text { * ovoj ku -i nedostaje i-kakvo mesto } & \text { da se sedi napolju kad pada ki a } \\
\text { this house-DAT lacks any-what-kind place } & \text { that self sits outside when falls rain } \\
& \text { where one can sit when it rains') }
\end{array} .
\end{array}
$$

Spanish also lacks 'free choice' readings of its NPIs, and NPIs are not allowed in these environments (Jàcas 1986):
(ii) * Noriega negó ninguna acusación de narcotráfico ('Noriega denied any allegation of drug trafficking')
For independent arguments that constituents like ningún are NPIs in Spanish, see Laka (1990, 1991).

## 2. An explanation of the asymmetry: $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ complementizers

### 2.1. The Proposal.

I will claim that the clausal/non-clausal contrasts presented in the previous section involve the presence versus absence of a 'negative' complementizer; that is, a complementizer that may be selected only by certain predicates. Lexical elements like deny and doubt select complementizers that have the feature $[\mathrm{Ng}]$, in the same way that lexical items like wonder and ask select complementizers that have the feature [Wh]. It is the complementizer that licenses the NPIs in the examples in (1). The absence of the complementizer precludes licensing of NPIs, and thus the fact that NPIs in non-clausal arguments are not licensed follows trivially.

The S-structure representations of the sentences in ( $1 \mathrm{a}, \mathrm{b}$ ), under this hypothesis, are as illustrated in (23a, b):


Previous discussions of this type of sentences assumed that the syntactic structure of the embedded sentences in (23a) and (23b) was identical to the strueture of a declarative clause like 'I say [that penguins fly]'. The NPI licensing properties thus
relied crucially on the structure of the matrix verb (Klima 1964), or on the downward entailing properties of the matrix predicate (Ladusaw 1979). Thus, in the case of doubt or deny, these analyses focus on the verbs themselves in order to account for licensing of NPIs across clause boundaries, failing to explain the asymmetry presented in section $1 .{ }^{9}$

The proposal made here follows the spirit of Progovac (1988), in that the syntactic representation of sentences embedded under inherently negative verbs diverges from the structure of that clauses embedded under non-negative verbs. Progovac (1988) argues that it is crucially the CP projection that is responsible for the successful NPI licensing inside the embedded clause. I depart form her analysis in the specifics of what in CP it is that licenses the NPIs. Progovac's proposal involves a polarity operator in the specifier of the CP projection, rather than a distinctive $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ complementizer head.

### 2.2. Some Further Supporting Evidence.

Added to the generalization presented in 1., there is more evidence internal to English supporting the existence of negative complementizers, which I will now discuss.

### 2.2.1. Lack of subject-object asymmetries

Subject NPIs in English are not licensed by sentence negation, because negation does not c-command the subject at S-structure; only when negation is placed in Comp can the subject NPI be licensed (Laka 1990). In the cases under consideration, the licenser is Comp itself, and, similar to cases where Neg has moved to Comp, licensing of subject NPIs obtains (24c):
(24) a. *[IpAnybody [I didn't leave]
b. [CPWhy didn't [IP anybody leave]]
c. I doubt [ CP that ${ }_{\mathrm{Ng}}$ [IP anybody left]]

As shown in (24a), if the licenser does not c-command the NPI at S-structure, licensing fails. Hence, a case where the negative verb does not c-command the NPI
(9) Hale (1968) makes a proposal regarding negation in Warlpiri, which involves selection of a negative AUX by a matrix negative verb; in this respect, the proposal put forward here resembles his. Warlpiri displays the negative kula attached to the front of the inflected auxiliary. But kula can also follow the element lawa:
(i) lawa kulaka-na pula-mi ( nat $^{y}$ u) negative neg-pres-I shout-nonpast (I) 'I am not shouting. It is negative (i.e., not so) that I am shouting.'
(ii) lawa kula-na-ZERO wawiri pantu-nu (nat ylu-lu) negative neg-defpast-I-it kangaroo spear-past (I-erg) 'I did not spear the kangaroo. It is not sot hat I speared the kangaroo'
Hale argues that the element lawa is not a constituent of the sentence containing the negative auxiliary, as evidenced by the ungrammaticality of (iii):
(iii) * kulaka-na lawa pula-mi (na ${ }^{y}$ tu)

Hale (1968) claims that lawa is a negative matrix verb, which takes the negative sentence as subject. He proposes that the embedded AUX acquires the negativized element by a special rule relating to the fact that its sentence is the subject of the negative verb.
but where the complementizer does is a crucial testing ground for this hypothesis. The prediction is that even if the verb does not c-command the NPI, the NPI will nevertheless be licensed, since the negative complementizer is still c-commanding it. This prediction is borne out, as the following example illustrates:
(25) [ $\mathrm{CP}^{\text {that }}{ }_{\mathrm{Ng}}$ [IP anybody left the room before dinner $\left.]\right]_{i}$ was denied $\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{i}}$ by the witnesses

In fact, it is precisely examples like the one in (25) that force Ladusaw (1979) to introduce an 'ad hoc' condition in his Inberent Scope Convention for the distribution of NPIs in English. Let us consider what the problem is that sentences like (25) pose for Ladusaw (1979).

### 2.2.2. Ladusaw (1979): precedence and clausemateness.

Under Ladusaw's (1979) definition of scope, both the subject and the VP are under the scope of negation in a clause. Ladusaw notes that, given this fact, it cannot be claimed that being in the scope of a trigger is a sufficient condition for the licensing of an NPI. If it were, subject NPIs would be licensed in negative sentences in English, and they are not. Moreover, Ladusaw notes that when a triggering element precedes the subject, that is, when it appears sentence initially, subject NPIs are licensed. The following examples are taken from his work:
(26) a. has anyone seen Clarence? b. rarely is anyone audited by the IRS

In light of these facts, Ladusaw (1979) must introduce an 'ad hoc' condition in the principles accounting for the distribution of NPIs; this condition requires that NPIs appear rightward of their triggers as well as within their scopes. Thus, the condition introduces a linear constraint in terms of precedence.

However, Ladusaw notes, when the negation is in a higher clause, the precedence condition does not apply anymore. The examples presented by Ladusaw are given in (27):
(27) a. that anyone has finished yet isn't likely is unlikely is doubtful
b. for John to have found any unicorns is impossible isn't possible
c. for anyone to win all six races would be unlikely

Because of examples like these, which are identical to (25) in all relevant respects, Ladusaw reduces the precedence condition to those cases where the trigger and the NPI are clausemates. The 'ad hoc' condition added is thus as follows: ${ }^{10}$
(10) Ladusaw also modifies che first part of his Inherent Scope Convention in accordance to (25).

Inherent Scope Convention (Ladusaw 1979)
A. Inheritance
(i) A meaning $m$ inherits the properties associated with the meaning which are its immediate components except as provided for in (ii) and (iii).
(ii) When an N -meaning becomes the scope of a trigger, the resulting meaning is no longer an N -meaning. If the NPI is clausemate with the trigger, the trigger must precede.
(iii) A sentence with a $W$-meaning produces a neutral meaning as an $\mathrm{S}^{\prime}$.
where N -meaning stands for the interpretation of a licensed NPI , and W -meaning is the interpretation of the so-called Positive Polarity Items.
(28) A NPI must appear in the scope of a trigger. If its trigger is in the same clause as the NPI, the trigger must precede the NPI.
(Ladusaw 1979: 112)
This solution is not very satisfactory, given the premises of Ladusaw's work: NPI licensing can only be accounted for in terms of the semantics of the clauses in which they occur, and not in terms of the syntax. The problem posed to the enterprise by the addition of this condition is in fact acknowledged by Ladusaw:

> In spite of the argument of section 0 , it is wrong to say that polarity filtering is totally semantic, since there is still reference to syntactic structure in part of the ISC [Inherent Scope Convention]: the left-right order restriction on clausemate triggers and NPI's. (Ladusaw 1979: 207)

Ladusaw also notes that this problem cannot be solved by simply altering the notion of scope, so that it will rule out those cases where the NPI is in the scope of the trigger but not licensed by it (as in cases of subject NPIs in negative sentences). Such a change, in fact, would make all the wrong predictions for all other cases of scope interactions. Indeed, the scope of the triggers does extend to those positions: if we substitute the NPIs with other types of quantifiers, the trigger has scope over the quantifier, as illustrated by Ladusaw in the following examples:
(29) a. Three of the students rarely finish their papers on time
b. Everyone rarely agrees on whether to get anchovies on a pizza

Hence, Ladusaw concludes, scope is not sufficient to determine NPI distribution, and the conditions on clausemateness and precedence must stay, even though they seem to threaten his central claim that 'the property that NPI's are sensitive to is not a property of sentences, it is a property that only expressions with functional meanings can have' (Ladusaw 1979: 2-3).

### 2.2.3. On the relevance of the Comp bead.

The problems encountered by Ladusaw (1979) can be avoided if we accept that syntactic structure plays a central role in determining the distribution of NPIs. I will argue that once the role of syntax in NPI licensing is acknowledged, the oddities displayed by NPIs as compared to other quantifiers are easily explained away.

The precedence condition is no longer necessary if the licensing conditions require that NPIs must be in the c-command domain of their triggers at S-structure. The clausemateness condition, on the other hand, can be done without once it is accepted that what licenses the NPI in the embedded clause is not the upstairs negative verb, but, rather, the complementizer that heads the embedded clause. Thus, all the problematic cases are reduced to S-structure c-command by the licenser of the NPI.

Let us go back to (25). As noted by Linebarger (1980), it cannot be argued that D-Structure plays any role in the licensing of NPIs, since subjects of passives are never licensed by an element that c-commands them at D -structure but not at S -structure:
*anybody wasn't arrested by the police

Therefore, the grammaticality of (25) could not be accounted for on the basis of the D-structure configuration. Neither can it be argued that the NPI in the embedded sentence is actually licensed by the negative verb at Logical Form, after some kind of reconstruction has taken place (Chomsky 1976, Van Riemsdijk \& Williams 1986 and references therein).

First, if reconstruction were available for NPI licensing, we would expect that a sentence like (30) would be grammatical. Second, even if we could somehow keep (30) aside, an account of (25) in terms of reconstruction would predict that an NPI in a preposed VP should be licensed even if the licenser is not preposed along with it. This, however, is not the case. Thus, consider the VP preposing cases in (31), which yield ungrammaticality:
(31) a. $*[\text { vp buy any records }]_{i}$, she didn't $t_{i}$
b. *[buy any records] is what she refused to do

The importance of the complementizer is also confirmed by the contrast between (32) and (33) (Pesetsky, p.c.):
(32) What did nobody do?
a. *Buy any records
b. Buy records
(33) What did Bill deny?
a. That he had bought any records

The answer to the question in (32a) is ungrammatical, because there is no available licenser in the VP that constitutes the answer. Note, however, that if the NPI is not present, the answer is fine, as in (32b). In contrast, the answer to the question in (33b), which has an NPI in it and does not contain the negative verb deny is perfectly grammatical. The crucial difference between (32a) and (33a) is the presence of the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{Ng}}$ heading the clause.

The evidence presented strongly suggests that it is precisely the complementizer of the embedded sentence in (25) that is making the difference. All the ungrammatical cases we have considered lack negative complementizers.

The presence or absence of the negative complementizer is also crucial in complements of 'inherently negative' nouns. Thus, consider the following contrasts:
(3.4) a. her denial that anybody left the room before the shooting surprised the jury
b. * her testimony that anybody left the room before the shooting surprised the jury
The paradigm in (34) is accounted for under the negative complementizer hypothesis: in (34a), denial selects a $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{Ng}}$, which in turn licenses the subject NPI in the clause it heads. In (34b), however, there is no $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{Ng}}$, because testimony does not select it. Therefore, NPI licensing fails.

Moreover, the following contrast illustrates that, parallel to the cases in (1), noun complements of 'negative' nouns also display a clausal/non clausal asymmetry:
(35) a. Her denial that any human rights should be respected shook the audience
b. * Her denial of any human rights shook the audience

Whereas (35a) is fine as a result of the NPI being licensed by the $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{Ng}}$, (35b) is either deviant or only acceptable in a 'free' reading, as the usual test of introducing just will confirm.

The assumption that 'inherently negative' lexical items select a complementizer that has the $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ feature explains the asymmetry presented in section 1., and it accounts more satisfactorily for the conditions under which NPI licensing takes place.

## 2.3. [ Ng ] and [Wh] complementizers.

There are some clear parallels and some not so clear issues that can be brought up regarding $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ and [Wh] complementizers.

### 2.3.1. Selection.

Let us first consider the parallels: The first similarity is that [Wh] complementizers can be selected by lexical items that have an 'interrogative' meaning like wonder and ask, and $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ complementizers can be selected by lexical items with a 'negative' meaning (deny and doubt, for instance). However, both complementizers can also occur in environments where the main verbs does not appear to be 'interrogative' or 'negative' in a straightforward manner. Take for instance the examples in (36):
a. I can't say whether Mary will arrive
b. That anyone might do anything like that never occurred to John

It is not a straightforward matter to determine in what sense say in (36a) is interrogative. Note further that the presence of the modal and not (or a Q morpheme in the matrix sentence) is necessary in order to allow the presence of the [Wh] complementizer in (36a). If the modal and not are missing, the embedded Complementizer can no longer be [Wh]: ${ }^{11}$
(37) *I say whether Mary will arrive

Similarly, in (36b), taken from Ladusaw (1979) the verb occur selects a $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ complementizer, ${ }^{12}$ although it is by no means an 'inherently negative' lexical item. The presence of the negative adverb is again mandatory to sanction the complementizer type, and its absence makes the selection of the negative complementizer invalid:
(38) *That ${ }_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ anyone might do anything like that often occurred to John

Feldman (1985) discusses many more cases that are similar to those in (36). Feldman (1985) notes that affectives in the sense of Klima (1964) and Ladusaw
(11) Note also that the verb say can always take a $[+w h]$ complementizer if the subject of the matrix sentence is focalized, as in (i):
(i) I say whether we will go on vacation or not!

This further illustrates that it is not solely the matrix verb that determines what complementizer is selected; rather, selection may involve more elements than just the matrix V, as noted long ago by Bresnan (1970) for the case of 'for to' infinitivals.
(12) Given that English does not overtly distinguish declarative complementizers from negative ones, the presence of a negative complementizer will be 'signaled' in the next by placing a NPI in the embedded clause.
(1979) and root modals can alter the selectional properties of certain verbs, ${ }^{13}$ in that the presence of these elements allows these verbs to take [Wh] complements. Some of the contrasts noted by Feldman (1985) are given in (39):
(39) a. *Albert said whether energy was matter
b. Albert didn't say whether energy was matter
c Why did you assume who I would bring?
d. They can never think what to do
e. We ought to deny how much John eats

Feldman (1985) concludes that the evidence forces us to abandon the idea that complement selection is determined by the verb of the matrix clause alone (Grimshaw 1979 and Pesetsky 1982). Rather, he suggests, complement selection must be viewed as a compositional process, one where not only the matrix verb, but also the inflectional elements of the matrix sentence play a role.

This conclusion seems to be further confirmed by data on $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{Ng}}$ selection, because a functional element distinct from the lexical verb affects the selection of the complementizer heading the embedded clause.

### 2.3.2. NPI licensing

Both [Wh] and [ Ng ] complementizers are NPI licensers, as shown in (40):
(40) a. I wonder whether anybody will show up
b. I deny that $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ anybody will show up

Given that in (40a) it is the complementizer that licenses the subject NPI in the embedded sentence, all the asymmetries observed in the case of negative verbs and $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{Ng}}$ also surface in relation to interrogative verbs and $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{WH}}$.

Thus for instance, similarly to the cases presented above, involving licensing of NPIs in the domain of negative verbs, there is also a clausal/non-clausal asymmetry when we consider interrogative verbs (H. Lasnik, p.c.). Consider (41a) and (41b):
(41) a. I wonder whether any questions will be asked
b. * I wonder about any questions

Whereas in (41a) the NPI any questions is licensed, this is not the case in (41b), where the NPI occurs in a non-clausal argument. As usual, we can resort to the just test: a non licensed any will be interpreted identically whether just is present or not; a licensed NPI is forced to acquire a 'free' interpretation and thus the conditions under which the sentence is true will change. Consider now (42a) and (42b), where just has been introduced:
(42) a. I wonder whether just any questions will be asked
b. I wonder about just any question

It is clear that just induces a change in the interpretation of (41a) and (42a). The

[^2]two sentences do not mean the same thing: in (41a) the subject wonders whether the number of questions asked will be zero or more than zero. In (42a), however, the subject of the sentence wonders about the kind of questions that will be asked. On the contrary, (41b) and (42b) have the same meaning. If anything, the only difference between the two is that (41b) is more easily acceptable than (42b). Nevertheless, both of them are instances of 'free' any.

If we passivize a sentence headed by a [Wh] complementizer, the NPI licensing properties of the embedded sentence do not change. This is shown in (43):
(43) $[\mathrm{CP} \text { Whether }[\mathrm{P} \text { anybody ever survives a plane crash }]]_{i}$ is often asked $\mathrm{t}_{\mathrm{i}}$ of commercial pilots by their passengers
In this respect too, the behavior of $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{WH}}$ is parallel to the pattern discussed in section 3.2. regarding $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{Ng}}$.

It is a well-established fact that [Wh] is an extremely active feature in Syntax (Chomsky 1977): it may trigger move $\alpha$, it is an affective element in the sense of Klima (1964), and it plays a fundamental role in complementation. But note that $[N g]$ is also an active syntactic feature or property: it may also induce move $\alpha$ (as in cases of Neg-Aux inversion, Klima 1964, Lasnik 1975), and it is an affective element (Klima 1964). This parallel extends to the domain of complementation, as we have seen.

In what follows, I will present abundant cross-linguistic evidence supporting the existence of $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ complementizers.

## 3. Evidence from Basque

### 3.1. A phonologically distinct $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ complementizer.

English does not distinguish overtly the [ Ng ] complementizer from declarative complementizers, in that both of them surface as that. However, if the two complementizers are indeed different syntactic entities, the expectation is that some languages will overtly distinguish them. Hence, we expect some languages to have one complementizer for the purely declarative cases and another complementizer for the cases where a negative complementizer is selected.

I will argue now that Basque is one of those languages. There is a declarative complementizer ela, ${ }^{14}$ whose distribution is like that of its English equivalent, the declarative that. Some instances of embedded clauses headed by ela are given in (44):
(44) a. [Galapagoak muskerrez beterik daudela] diote Galapagos lizards-of full are-that say-they 'They say that the Galapagos are full of lizards'
b. [Hiriak eta ibaiak kutsaturik daudela] uste dugu cities and rivers polluted are-that think have-we 'We think that the cities and the rivers are polluted'

[^3]There is also a [Wh] complementizer, distinct from ela, which occurs in embedded clauses where some operator movement has taken place. This is the complementizer en. The examples in (45) show an indirect question (45a), and a relative clause (45b), both headed by the complementizer $e n$.
(45) a. [Telebistako langileek greba egingo duten] galdetu diet television-of workers strike make will-whether asked have-I 'I have asked them whether the television workers will go on strike'
b. [Juanek erosi duen] kotxea 'Mazda Miata' bat da Juan bought has-that car-the 'Mazda Miata' one is 'The car that Juan has bought is a 'Mazda Miata"

There is also a third complementizer that occurs in direct object embedded clauses. This complementizer is enik; it is selected in negative environments like the ones we have been considering in the beginning of this chapter. The complementizer enik can be selected when the matrix verb is inherently negative, as in (46a, b):
(46) a. Amaiak [inork gorrotoa dionik] ukatu du

Amaia anyone hatred has-her-that denied has
'Amaia denied that anybody hated her'
b. Lekukoek [gau hartan inor jauregira hurbildu zenik] ukatu dute witnesses night that anyone castle-to near was-that denied have 'The witnesses denied that anyone got near the castle that night'
The examples in (46a) and (46b) also show that Negative Polarity Items (inork, inor) are licensed interclausally in these cases, just like in English in the previous section.

Since the claim made here is that the Comp head is the element responsible for the licensing of the NPIs in the embedded clause, we expect to find a sharp clausal/non-clausal asymmetry in Basque as well. The asymmetry does indeed exist: when the verb ukatu takes a complement without a Comp head in it, licensing of NPIs in that argument is no longer possible and the sentences are ungrammatical:
a. * Josebak ezer ukatu du Joseba anything denied has ('Joseba has denied anything')
b. * Lekukoek hertzainak esandako ezer ukatuko dute witnesses policeman said anything deny will they (The witnesses will deny anything said by the policeman')

Parallel to the English cases, a 'free choice' reading of the NPI is possible in these contexts in Basque. Thus, as in English, in (47b), the NPI ezer can be even more easily interpreted as a 'free choice' element if the matrix verb is in the future, if modals are added, and also if the matrix verb is focalized. ${ }^{15}$

The example in (48) has all these: the sentence has the irrealis modal, the verb is heavily focalized, and the object of ukatu 'deny' is modified by an infinitival adjectival clause. ${ }^{16}$
(48) Lekukoek ukatu egingo lukete nik esandako ezer witnesses deny do-irr would I said-that anything 'The witnesses would deny anything said by me'

But, also in Basque, there are ways to distinguish the two types of readings by introducing certain modifiers. The test is essentially identical to those used before for English. Here I will present just one test that distinguishes licensed NPIs from 'free choice' ones in Basque.

The test involves the introduction of the adverb ere. Sarasola (1984) notes that this particle can be attached to NPIs in negative contexts. The particle ere cannot be successfully attached to an NPI that has not been licensed. ${ }^{17}$ The basic contrast induced by ere is illustrated in (49). The example in (49a) shows a NPI in a negative sentence; it has ere attached to it and the sentence is grammatical. However, in (49b), ere is attached to an NPI that is not licensed. The result is ungrammatical.
(49) a. Ikernek ez du ezer ere aurkitu

Ikerne no has anything found
'Ikerne hasn't found anything at all'
b. *Zuk esandako ezer ere sinistuko nuke nik
you said anything believe would I
('I would believe anything at all you said')
Consider now the contrast that obtains when ere is attached to NPIs in the domain of $u k a t u$ 'to deny': the NPIs inside a clause can be modified by ere, but the ones not headed by the enik complementizer cannot, as illustrated in the following examples:
(16) In addition to allowing its NPI to acquire a 'free choice' reading, Basque also has a separate lexical item with the same meaning as Spanish cualquier, a 'free choice' universal quantifier:
(iii) edonor etor daiteke
anybody come can
'anybody can come'
These facts seem to refute Progovac's (1990) claim that Negative Polarity any and 'free choice' any are separate lexical items that happen to be homophonous in English. Progovac (1990) argues that whereas one of the any's is a Negative Polarity Item, the other one is the equivalent of Romance cualquier. The fact that Basque has a three way distinction, which incorporates both a possibility of having 'free choice' readings of the element that is interpreted as an NPI when licensed, and also a separate lexical item with an exclusive 'free choice' interpretation acquired in different contexts must lie on the nature of the licenser and its relation with the Negative Polarity Item, rather than on a phonological homophony.
(17) This particle does not have an exact equivalent in English. On top of the use of ere that is being considered in this test, Sarasola (1984) distinguishes the following uses of ere:
(a) After something has been affirmed or denied, it is used to affirm or deny something else. In this value, it is similar to English 'too' and 'neither'
(b) If attached to conditionals it is equivalent to English 'even': "even if..."
(c) Attached to Wh-words it is equivalent to English 'ever', as in 'whoever', 'whatever', 'wherever' etc.

I will translate it as 'at all' in the examples below.
(50) a. Amaiak [inork ere gorrotoa dionik] ukatu du Amaia anyone hatred has-her-that denied has 'Amaia denied that anybody at all hated her'
b. * Lekukoek ukatu egingo lukete nik esandako ezer ere witnesses deny do would I said-that anything ('The witnesses would deny anything at all said by me')

These results prove that whereas the NPIs in the clausal complements of $u k a t u$ 'to deny' are licensed, the ones in non clausal complements are not instances of licensed NPIs, also in Basque, like in English.

When the matrix sentence involves an overt negation, the [ Ng ] complementizer can also be selected, as in (51):
(51) Ez du Zuriñek [inor etorriko denik] esan
no has Zuriñe anyone come will that said
'Zuriñe has not said that anybody will come'
The example also illustrates that interclausal NPI licensing is also possible in matrix sentences involving overt negation. As expected, in these cases no asymmetry arises with respect to the type of complement taken by the verb, as shown by (49a) and (51).

Since it occurs in the same environments as the postulated [ Ng ] complementizer in the beginning of this paper, and since it displays the same properties as its equivalent in English, I conclude that the complementizer enik is the [ Ng ] complementizer in Basque. It is the phonologically distinct version of English that $[\mathrm{Ng}] .{ }^{18}$

### 3.2. Selection of $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ is not obligatory.

The fact that the $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ complementizer is phonologically distinct in Basque allows us to observe contrasts that are not directly detectable in English.

One important fact to be discussed now is that the selection of $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ complementizer is not the only option in negative environments: rather, both the negative complementizer enik and the declarative complementizer ela can be selected, as shown by (52a) and (52b):
(52) a. Iñigok ez du sinisten [lurrak eztanda egingo duela]

Iñigo no has believed earth explode do will that 'Iñigo does not believe that the earth will explode'
b. Iñigok ez du sinisten [lurrak eztanda egingo duenik] Iñigo no has believed earth explode do will that $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ 'Iñigo does not believe that the earth will explode'
(18) The reader might have noticed that all examples of inherently negative verbs given for Basque involve the verb $u k a t u$ 'to deny'. It seems to be a fact that inherent negative lexical items are extremely scarce in Basque. Thus, the equivalent of English doubt and Spanish dudar is not a verb, but a combination of the noun zalantza 'doubt' and the verb egin 'make'. A simple form zalantzatu does exist, but is never used as a transitive verb, but as unaccusative. In general, 'I doubt that...' is expressed by means of 'I don't think that...'.

Under the hypothesis that enik is the $[N g]$ complementizer in Basque, and that ela is the declarative one, lacking the fearure [ $\varnothing \mathrm{Ng}$ ], the prediction is that NPIs will only be licensed in clauses headed by enik, not in clauses headed by ela. ${ }^{19}$ This is in fact the case, as illustrated by the contrast in (53): ${ }^{20}$
(53) a. * Iñigok ez du sinisten [ezerk eztanda egingo duela] Iñigo no has believe anything explode do will that ('Iñigo does not believe that anything will explode')
b. Iñigok ez du sinisten [ezerk eztanda egingo duenik] Iñigo no has believe anything explode do will that ${ }_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ 'Iñigo does not believe that anything will explode'

The contrast illustrated in (53) cannot be detected in English because the two complementizers (53a) and (53b) are phonologically identical. Presumably, then, the English equivalent of ( 52 b ) is always interpreted as being structurally identical to (52a), that is, to be headed by a $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ complementizer, since the phonological output always matches the grammatical derivation.

### 3.3. Semantic differences in each choice.

One further contrast that is directly observable in Basque but not in English, concerns the different semantic interpretation attached to each choice of complementizer in a negative environment. Whether the embedded sentence is headed by ela, the declarative complementizer, or enik, the negative one, is not semantically neutral.

In this respect, we must qualify the claim made above about optionality in selection: selection of enik or ela in negative contexts is optional in that either choice yields a possible syntactic derivation; but the optionality is not such in that it makes a difference for NPI licensing (as seen above) and also for semantic interpretation.

I will argue that the presence of the [ Ng ] complementizer results in an interpretation where the embedded clause is under the scope of negation, whereas the choice of the non-negative complementizer results in an interpretation where the embedded clause is not. This fact results in the different truth value of the embedded sentence with respect to the matrix one.

Saltarelli (1988) describes the difference between enik and ela as a difference in presupposition of truth values: ${ }^{21}$
(19) I have argued in Laka (1990b) that the complementizer ela is in fact empty in its syntactic features.
(20) Azkue (1923) notes that some dialects of Basque do not have enik complementizers. Eastern dialects like Labourdin, for instance, have a different distribution of complementizers without the option of enik (B. Oyharçabal, p.c.). I assume that these dialects are like English, in that the distinction between declarative a negative complementizers is not overt. Interestingly, Lafitte (1979) notes that older stages of these eastern dialects did have the enik complementizer, which has only recently been put out of use.
(21) The negative complementizer enik has a great morphological similarity with the partitive case ik. In fact, the complementizer enik appears to be composed of the interrogative complementizer en and the partitive marker $i k$. This fact has not gone unnoticed in the literature. The parallel between the negative complementizer enik and the partitive case has been pointed out at least in Azkue (1905), and in Saltarelli (1988).
-(e)nik is affixed to the embedded verb of complements of negative main clause verbs (...). However, when the truth of the embedded clause is presupposed on the part of the speaker, -(e)la will appear as the complementizer. (Saltarelli 1988: 32)

This description seems rather accurate. Hence, for instance, the difference between (53a) and (53b) is the following: In (53a), that the earth is going to explode is taken to be a fact. What the sentence means, then, is that Inigo does not believe something that is true. However, (53b) simply means that Iñigo does not believe that the earth will explode, but this later proposition is not taken to be a fact; it could be true or false, and therefore Iñigo could be right or wrong. Consider the sentence in (54):
(54) Galileok ez zuen sinisten [eguzkia lurrari inguruka zebilenik] Galileo no had believed sun-the earth-to turns-in went-that 'Galileo did not believe that the sun revolved around the earth'

This sentence does not entail that what Galileo did not believe was necessarily true. Now, if we change the complementizer heading the embedded clause and insert ela, the declarative complementizer instead, as in (56),
(56) Galileok ez zuen sinisten [eguzkia lurrari inguruka zebilela]

Galileo no had believed sun-the earth-to turns-at goes-that 'Galileo did not believe that the sun revolved around the earth'
the reading that obtains is that we take it to be a fact about the world that the sun turns around the earth, and that Galileo did not believe that. Judging from the sentence in (56), we are led to believe that Galileo must have been wrong.

These different semantic interpretations can be accounted for under the assumption that the enik complementizer is necessarily interpreted under the scope of the negative element that selects it, whereas the ela complementizer is interpreted outside the scope of the matrix negative. That is to say, at the level of Logical Form the sentences headed by enik remain in the scope of the matrix Infl and V , whereas the sentences headed by ela do not. A specific way of implementing this idea is to assume that embedded clauses headed by ela undergo Quantifier Raising at Logical Form (May 1985), whereas the clauses headed by enik do not.

Of course, this is a fact about $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{Ng}}$, and not about its particular instantiation in Basque. We will see in the next section that this semantic difference is manifested also in Spanish. ${ }^{22}$
(22) There is one more instance where the complementizer enik is selected. Certain rhetorical questions allow it too:
(i) Nork uste izango zuen Bilbon honenbeste kojo zegoenik? who thought would have Bilbo-in so many crippled were that 'Who would have thought that there were so many cripples in Bilbao?'
This example (from Bustintza 1918), is noted by Altube (1929), who nevertheless considers it a 'negative environment'. As suggested by Ken Hale (p.c.), the occurrence of enik in these rethorical questions is consistent with the description, because all cases entail doubt. Thus, (i) presupposes the doubt that there would be so many cripples in Bilbao. Interestingly, Spanish licenses dubitative subjunctives in these environments:
(ii) ¿Quién iba a pensar que hubiera tanto cojo en Bilbao?

Who would have thought that there were so many cripples in Bilbao?
See below for an account of dubitate subjunctive as an instance of $\mathrm{C}_{\mathrm{N} g}$.

## 4. Evidence from Romance: dubitative subjunctive

In this section, I will concentrate on the relation between the $\mathrm{C}[\mathrm{Ng}]$ and subjunctive mood in Spanish (the results extend also at least to Catalan). I argue that the $\mathrm{C}[\mathrm{Ng}]$ in Spanish selects subjunctive mood; this combination of $\mathrm{C}[\mathrm{Ng}]$ and subjunctive is what is referred to as dubitative subjunctive by traditional grammars. I will show that the $\mathrm{C}[\mathrm{Ng}]$ accounts not only for the interclausal NPI licensing in these cases, but also the occurrence of subjunctive mood in negative environments.

### 4.1. Interclausal NPI licensing in Spanish.

Similarly to the English and Basque cases discussed in the previous sections of this paper, there are certain environments where Negative Polarity Items (NPIs) are licensed in embedded clauses of inherently negative verbs in Spanish. Thus, for instance, in the examples in (57), a postverbal NPI is licensed without having any overt licenser within the embedded sentence.
a. Dudo que lo sepa nadie 'I doubt that anybody knows that'
b. El testigo negó que la acusada le hubiera dicho nada 'The witness denied that the defendant had told him anything'
c. Ella ignoraba que hubiésemos estado nunca en Menorca 'She didn't know that we had ever been in Menorca'

NPIs like the ones in (57) require an affective element c-commanding them in order to be licensed (Laka 1990). The examples in (57) are parallel to the ones in (1) in all respects. Hence, as expected, they display the same asymmetry discussed in the first section of this chapter: NPIs are only licensed in CP arguments, but not in DP arguments. Thus compare (57) to (58), where NPIs heading DP complements induce ungrammatical results: ${ }^{23}$
a. * Dudo nada de lo que me ha dicho ('I doubt anything of what she told me')
b. * El testigo negó nada de lo que la acusada le dijo ('The witness denied anything of what the defendant told him')
c. * Ella ignoraba nada sobre nuestros viajes ('She didn't know anything about our trips')

There is no 'free choice' reading or any other kind of interpretation that can be assigned to the sentences in (58). In this respect, the only difference with respect to English and Basque is that the asymmetry is more immediately perceived in Romance: the examples in (58) simply have no appropriate interpretation, and hence there is no need to resort to independent tests to prove that they do not contain licensed NPIs.
(23) The contrast between (52) and (53) is noted in a footnote in Kempchinsky (1986), where the observation is attributed tờ Jacàs. Jacàs observed that verbs like dudar do not license NPIs in their own clause. Example (53a) is the one pointed out by Jacàs (Cf. Kempchinsky 1986: 206).

Also as expected, cases where an overt negation is involved do not display any clausal/non-clausal asymmetry: in both cases, the NPI is licensed and the sentences are grammatical (59):
a. Ella no ha dicho que pase nada malo
'She hasn't said that anything bad happens'
b. Ella no ha dicho nada
'She hasn't said anything'

## 4.2 $C_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ and Subjunctive Mood.

Given the results obtained so far, we can conclude that the $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ hypothesis is supported by the Spanish data. Spanish is like English and not like Basque, in that the declarative complementizer and the $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ one are phonologically indistinguishable: both surface as que. However, Spanish is unlike English and like Basque in that there is something else that $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ affects: the mood of the sentence it heads.

All the embedded sentences we have considered so far are inflected for subjunctive mood. The subjunctive mood is in fact required in sentences headed by a negative complementizer. This fact makes the Spanish cases of negative complementizers overtly different from declarative complementizers. It allows us to determine more exactly the distribution of this complementizer: we can now compare the behavior of the Basque complementizer enik with the evidence from Spanish in order to further establish the nature of the $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ in Universal Grammar.

As expected, given the evidence from Basque presented in the previous section, the choice between $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ and declarative complementizer is available also in Spanish. Thus, it is possible to have indicative sentences as complements of negative verbs, as (60) illustrates:
(60) a. Sancho ignora [que su señor está arruinado]
'Sancho does not know that his lord is broke'
b. Este libro niega [que Lorca fué asesinado]
'This book denies that Lorca was murdered'
But when the mood of the embedded sentence is indicative, it is no longer possible to have an NPI in it licensed without the sentence itself being negated:
(61) a. *Sancho ignora [que su señor debe nada]
('Sancho does not know that his lord owes anything')
b. *Este libro niega [que Lorca fué nunca asesinado] ('This book denies that Lorca was ever murdered')
These facts parallel exactly the data on Basque presented in the previous section, and thus they confirm that $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ is not obligatorily selected by the lexical items that can select it.

The sentences in (61) contrast minimally with those in (57). The only overt difference is the mood of the sentence. We can therefore reasonably assume that there is some relation between the subjunctive mood and the $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$.

This relation between subjunctive and $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ could not however be one of identity; if it were, that would imply that whenever subjunctive mood is present we
should find all the effects that the postulated negative complementizer induces. For instance, NPIs should be licensed in all subjunctive sentences. That this is not the case is shown in (62), where the embedded sentences are inflected for subjunctive mood, and nevertheless the NPIs are not licensed, inducing ungrammaticality:

> a. *Carmen quiere [que la asamblea decida nada] ('Carmen wants the assembly to decide anything')
> b. *Andone espera [que sus experimentos resuelvan nada] ('Andone hopes that her experiments will solve anything')

The examples in (62) show: first, that the postulated $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ and the subjunctive mood are not the same entity, because here we have sentences inflected for subjunctive mood where NPIs are not licensed, unlike in the ones in (62). Second, these examples also show that not all occurrences of subjunctive involve a $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$.

The claim I am putting forward is that subjunctive mood is required in a sentence headed by a $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$. However, a $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ is not required whenever a sentence is inflected for subjunctive mood. I will later discuss the status of subjunctive mood in Spanish, and argue that subjunctive is in fact an irrealis modal. ${ }^{24}$ The reason why clauses headed by $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ are inflected for subjunctive mood is because these clauses, being under the scope of negation ( Cf . section 3.3.) are irrealis. Thus, all the contrasts observed for Basque in sections 3.2. and 3.3. hold also of the subjunctive/indicative distinction in Spanish. This is illustrated in the following examples, (from Kempchinsky 1986):
(63) a. No me pareció que el bar estuviera cerrado; es más, creo que está abierto
'It didn't seem to me that the bar wassubj closed; what's more, it is open'
b. *No me pareció que el bar estaba cerrado; es más, creo que está abierto
'It didn't seem to me that the bar was closed; what's more, it is open'
The contrast between the perfect (63a) and the anomalous (63b) is totally determined by the presence versus absence of the $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ (reflected in the change of mood in inflection). The fact is that the bar is open. If it didn't look closed to me, I could say so as in (63a), where there is a $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ and thus the sentence is interpreted under the scope of negation. It would still make sense to admit that the bar is in fact open. In contrast, (63b) is anomalous because the embedded sentence is headed by a declarative Comp, which will not be interpreted under the scope of negation. The meaning of ( 63 b ) is 'the bar was closed but it didn't seem like that to me'; thus the anomaly of following the sentence with a statement about the bar being in fact open. ${ }^{25}$

[^4]These data are exactly parallel to the contrasts observed in Basque regarding the use of the $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ (enik) or the declarative complementizer (ela). Thus, we can conclude that it is a general property of the $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ that it demands that the sentence it heads be interpreted under the scope of the matrix negation.

## 4.3. $C_{N g}$ and Movement to $\Sigma P$.

In Laka (1990) and (1991b), I have given an account of the distribution and behavior of N -words (elements like nadie, nada, ningún, etc.) in Spanish: N -words are Negative Polarity Items (NPIs), and therefore require a licenser at S-Structure. When these N -words occur preceding Inflection in a clause, they have moved to the specifier of $\Sigma P$, which is headed by the phonologically empty element [NEG]. Whereas the N -word in the specifier of $\mathbf{P}$ licenses the projection, the head licenses the NPI in the specifier via SPEC-Head agreement. Thus, the S-structure representation of a sentence with a preverbal N -word is as in (64):


Infl must raise to the head of $\Sigma \mathrm{P}$ at S-structure, in order to satisfy the Tense C-Command Condition (Laka 1990). Further, the agreement relation between nadie and the head of $\Sigma \mathrm{P}$ must also be satisfied at S-Structure.

If we combine these two independent hypotheses, we obtain the following scenario. In clauses headed by $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$, there are two ways in which a preverbal N -word can be licensed: there is a negative complementizer available, which c-commands the NPI and thus licenses it, as we have seen in the previous section. Thus, the first prediction is that preverbal N -words will be licensed in the same way that postverbal ones are. But, moreover, there is also the possibility of having a preverbal NPI sitting in the specifier of a $\Sigma \mathrm{P}$ headed by [ $N E G$ ]. In this latter case, there will be two negative licensers available. The interpretation of the sentence should therefore reflect this fact.

I will now show that the scenario just described does indeed obtain in Spanish, ${ }^{26}$ and that $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ and $\Sigma \mathrm{P}$ interact inducing interesting effects in the interpretation of the sentences.

Bosque (1980) notes that a preposed nadie word can be ambiguous between and existential reading and a universal negative reading. The sentence in (65) is one of the examples given by him:
(65) Es impossible [que nadie lo sepa] Is impossible that anybody it know $_{\text {SUBJ }}$
(26) All the effects about to be presented obtain also in Catalan (E. Bonet and E. Benedicto, p.c.).

The sentence in (65) has the interesting property of having two readings that happen to be contradictory. The two meanings that the sentence can have are given in (66), and they crucially involve the interpretation of the word nadie:
a. It is impossible that anybody knows it
b. It is impossible that nobody knows it

This kind of contradictory ambiguity extends in fact to all cases where a $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ is involved. Some more examples are presented in (67) and (68):
(67) El director duda [que nadie venga al estreno]

1. 'The director doubts that anybody will come to the prèmiere'
2. 'The director doubts that nobody will come to the prèmiere'
(68) La ministra negó que [nada hubiera cambiado]
3. 'The minister denied that anything had changed'
4. 'The minister denied that nothing had changed'

Given the two possible ways in which N -words can be licensed in sentences headed by $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$, the contradictory readings of the sentences in (65), (67) and (68) are straightforwardly accounted for:
a) In the cases where the preverbal N -word is interpreted as an existential (that is, the anybody reading in (67.1) and (68.1)), what we have is licensing by the $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$, and the N -word is sitting in the specifier of IP.
b) In the interpretation where nadie has a universal negative quantifier interpretation (that is, the 'nobody' readings in (67.2) and (68.2)), the N -word is sitting in the spec of $\Sigma \mathrm{P}$ headed by [NEG].

The S-structure representations of the first readings are illustrated in (69):
(69) a. El director duda CP


b. La ministra negó CP


In the second reading, the $\Sigma \mathrm{P}$ has been projected: it is headed by the [ $N E G$ ] element. The preverbal N -word now sits in its specifier, and it is thus licensed by it, as in matrix clauses. Hence, as in matrix clauses, the $\mathbf{N}$-word is interpreted with a universal negative reading. The S-structure representations are illustrated in (70):
(70)
a. El director duda CP

b. La ministra negó


Given that these latter readings involve $\Sigma P$, we expect that they will be available also in embedded sentences where there is no negative complementizer. Thus, for instance, CP complements of negative verbs that are inflected for indicative mood can have preverbal N -words. But these indicative sentences are not headed by $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$, and, therefore, unlike the sentences headed by CNg , they display no ambiguity:
a. Sancho ignora [que nadie es perfecto] 'Sancho does not know that nobody is perfect'
b. Este libro niega [que nadie vive en el Everest] 'This book denies that nobody lives in the Everest'
Recall that certain adverbs, like frecuentemente 'often', can occur between the specifier of IP and I, that is, between the subject and the inflected verb, but not between the specifier of $\Sigma P$ and $\Sigma$. This fact accounted for the following contrast (72):
(72) a. [IPMaría [rfrecuentemente [ [rcanta en la ducha]]]
b.* [ ${ }_{\Sigma \mathrm{P}} \mathrm{Nadie}\left[\Sigma^{\prime}\right.$ frecuentemente [ ${ }_{\mathrm{NEG}}$ canta [ip en la ducha]]]]
c. [ ${ }_{\mathrm{P}} \mathrm{Nadie}$ [ ${ }_{\mathrm{NEG}}$ canta [IP frecuentemente en la ducha]]]

Given that the ambiguity of sentences like (67) and (68) involves representations like (72a) and (72c), the prediction is that if an adverb like frecuentemente intervenes
between nadie and the inflected verb, the ambiguity will disappear, and only an existential meaning will be available. This is so because the only possible S-structure representation where the adverb intervenes between nadie and the inflected verb is the one where nadie sits in the specifier of IP and the inflected verb sits in I. The prediction is borne out, as (73) illustrates:
(73) a.El director duda [que ningún actor frecuentemente olvide su texto] 'The director doubts that any actor often forgets his text'
b. La ministra negó [que nadie frecuentemente hubiera destruído documentos comprometedores]
'The minister denied that anybody often destroyed compromising documents'

In these cases, the only reading available is the one where the only licenser available is the complementizer. The embedded sentence is no longer interpreted as having a negation in it; there is no [ $N E G$ ] heading a $\Sigma \mathrm{P}$ phrase.

I have shown previously that [Wh] complementizers are also NPI licensers, in the same way $[\mathrm{Ng}]$ ones are (Cf. section 2.3.). Given this fact and the account of the ambiguities that I have just given, the prediction is made that the same ambiguities as in (65), (67) and (68) must arise also in contexts where a [Wh] complementizer is involved. This is indeed the case. Consider (74) and (75):
(74) Me pregunto [si nadie vendrá a la fiesta]

1. 'I wonder whether anybody will come to the party'
2. 'I wonder whether nobody will come to the party'
(75) Le gustaría saber [si nada ha cambiado desde que se fué]
3. 'She would like to know whether anything changed since she left'
4. 'She would like to know whether nothing has changed since she left'

The explanation for these ambiguities is of course identical to the one given before: In the first readings (English translation number 1), the NPI is licensed by the complementizer, and the NPI is sitting in the specifier of IP. In the second reading, the $\Sigma \mathrm{P}$ has been projected, headed by [ $N E G$ ], and the N -word is sitting in its specifier. This is why the sentence is now interpreted as having a negative element in it.

### 4.4. Volitional subjunctive and $C_{N g}$.

It has already been shown that not all subjunctive clauses are headed by a $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$. Hence, for instance, subjunctive clauses embedded under volitional verbs do not allow postverbal NPIs:
(76) *Koke espera [que venga nadie al estreno]

Koke hopes that come ${ }_{\text {SUBJ }}$ anybody to the prèmiere
Fronted N -words are allowed but they display no ambiguity. They are unequivocally
interpreted as universal negatives, the interpretation obtained when these words have moved to the specifier of $\Sigma \mathrm{P}$ headed by [NEG]. This is shown in (77):
(77) Koke espera [CP que [ $\Sigma \mathrm{P}$ nadie venga al estreno]
'Koke hopes that nobody will come to the prèmiere'
The S-structure representation of (77) is as in (78):
(78) Koke espera


The question that arises is what the behavior of these clauses is when the volitional verb is negated. We will now see that, when the matrix verb is negated, these types of clauses pattern like the cases considered above. They license Polarity Items even though there is no overt licenser in the clause, as illustrated in (79):
(79) Lander no quiere [que cambie nada]
'Lander doesn't want anything to change'
And when the N -word is preverbal, it displays the same type of ambiguity we have discussed above. Thus, consider (80):

## Pablo no quiere [que nada cambie]

1. 'Pablo does not want anything to change'
2. 'Pablo does not want nothing to change'

We can therefore conclude that volitional subjunctives are headed by a $\mathrm{C}_{[\mathrm{Ng}]}$ when the matrix sentence is negative. In this respect, volitional subjunctives are like any other clause. Moreover, they provide further evidence that subjunctive mood is not the key factor in the negative complementation, but rather a side effect. The crucial element in negative complementation is the head of C .

### 4.2. On the relation between $C_{N g}$ and Subjunctive Mood.

Studies of subjunctive undertaken within the GB framework (Cf. Picallo 1985, Kempchinsky 1986 and references therein) have concentrated on a salient phenomenon found in subjunctive clauses, first pointed out by Guéron (1978). I will refer to this phenomenon as the Subject Disjoint Reference effect (name due to Kempchinsky 1985, henceforth SDR); it is illustrated in the examples in (81a, b):

> a. Mingo $_{i}$ dice [que pro $_{i}$ canta un fandango] 'Mingo says that she sings a fandango'
> b. $*$ Mingo $_{i}$ quiere [que pro $_{i}$ cante un fandango] Mingo wants that sing subj a fandango ('Mingo wants to sing a fandango')
> c. Mingo quiere que [ pro $_{j}$ cante un fandango] Mingo wants that sing subj a fandango 'Mingo wants her to sing a fandango'

In example (81a) we can see an embedded sentence inflected for indicative mood. The subject of the embedded sentence is pro, and it can be coreferent with the subject of the matrix clause, as expected under condition B of Binding Theory. In contrast with this, consider (81b), which is inflected for subjunctive mood. Coreference between the embedded pro and the subject of the sentence is not possible. (81c) illustrates that the effect has nothing to do with the possibility of licensing the empty category pro in the subjunctive clause. It is the correference between the subjects that is not possible.

Most accounts of this SDR effect have linked it to the very nature of subjunctive mood. Thus, for instance, one intuition shared by many proposals crucially relies on the properties of Tense in subjunctive clauses. Bouchard (1982) bases his account of the SDR effect on Bresnan's (1972) observation that subjunctives and infinitives are 'unrealized tenses'. Johnson (1984) and Picallo (1984), (1985) argue that the Tense of the subjunctive clauses is anaphoric and must be bound by the matrix Tense much in the same fashion in which anaphors must be bound in their governing category.

If the SDR effect is crucially linked to the nature of subjunctive Tense, the prediction is that all clauses inflected for subjunctive mood will display the SDR effect. This is not true, as noted by Padilla-Rivera (1985). ${ }^{27}$ Subjunctive clauses embedded under inherently negative verbs do not display any SDR effect, as shown in (82):
a. Maitane $\mathrm{i}_{\mathrm{i}}$ ignoraba [que pro $_{\mathrm{i}}$ bubiera ganado el concurso] 'Maitane didn't know that she had subj won the contest'
b. Santi ${ }_{i}$ duda [que pro vaya a encontrar trabajo este año] 'Santi doubts that he will subj find a job this year'
Kempchinsky (1986) concludes that subjunctive complements to verbs of doubt /denial, and in some dialects of Spanish and the other Romance languages, to factive emotive predicates, allow correference of the embedded subject with the matrix subject. Only verbs of volition and influence show SDR effects in their complements.

When we consider the data from dubitative subjunctive, it becomes apparent that whatever induces the SDR effect, it cannot be just the subjunctive inflection.
(27) See this work for an extensive discussion on Tense restrictions in subjuntive clauses, where volitional contexts again differ from dubitative ones: the later do not display the restrictions that are typical of the former. This undermines the claim that it is in the very nature of subjuntive mood to be restricted in choice of Tense. Only certain subjunctives are restricted in that respect.

### 4.3 The Structure of Inflection in Spanish.

I want to put forward the traditional idea that subjunctive is not a Tense, but a Modal. In particular, the inflectional structure I want to propose is the following:


Where subjunctive is a separate head from Tense, and in the same category as future. Romance subjunctive has properties similar to modals in other languages (Kempchinsky 1986). The X' implementation of the inflectional structure of Spanish presented in (83) makes some immediate predictions: whereas future and subjunctive cannot coocur in a sentence, both values of Tense can in principle cooccur with any of the values of the Modal Phrase, future and subjunctive. These predictions are borne out.

Regarding the coocurrence of future and subjunctive, the prediction is confirmed: modern Spanish lacks any future subjunctive. Old Spanish, which presumably had a different inflectional structure, did have what is called the 'future subjunctive'. This future subjunctive is shown in (84):
(84) Adonde fueres, haz lo que vieres 'Wherever you go, do whatever you see'

These forms are substituted by present subjunctive in modern Spanish. ${ }^{28}$ Only in fossilized registers of the language, like old sayings or law, can these forms be found nowadays.

As for the interaction between the two values of Tense and the two values of Modal, they are all possible and instantiated in the verbal paradigms of Spanish. Let us consider them:
(i) Combination of [present] and [future] is the simple future: ire 'I'll go'; comeré 'r'll eat'...
(ii) Combination of [present] and [subjunctive] results in present subjunctive: vaya 'I gosubj'; coma 'I eat ${ }_{\text {SUBJ }}$ '
(iii) Combination of [past] and [future] yields the conditional: iría 'I'd go'; comería ' T 'd eat'
(iv) Combination of [past] and [subjunctive] results in the past subjunctive: fuera 'I wentsubj'; comiera 'I eatsubj'
All other verbal paradigms are obtained from the interaction of the heads in Tense and Modal with the category Aspect. When Aspect is [perfect], the past participle morpheme do heads the Aspect projection.
(28) Hence, for instance, the saying illustrated in (47) is stated in present subjunctive nowadays:
(i) Adonde fueras, haz lo que vieras

The verb will raise to Asp and no further, exactly like periphrastic verbs in Basque raise to Aspect and no further (Laka 1990). The Auxiliary verb generated in AuxP is now the one that will raise to Modal and eventually to Tense. It will therefore be the auxiliary verb that supports the morphology generated by the different values of the heads Tense and Modal.


Hence, we find the same array of choices illustrated in (i) to (iv) above, repeated for the baber auxiliary of periphrastic forms, which differ from the ones above in that the value of aspect is now [perfective]. The perfective forms are illustrated in (v) to (viii):
(v) Combination of (i) and [perfective]:
babré ido 'I'll have gone'
babré comido 'I'll have eaten'
(vi) Combination of (ii) and [perfective]:
babría ido 'I would have gone' babría comido 'I would have eaten'
(vii) Combination of (iii) and [perfective]: baya ido 'I have ${ }_{\text {SUBJ }}$ gone' bay comido 'I have ${ }_{\text {SUBJ }}$ eaten'
(viii) Combination of (iv) and [perfective]:
bubiera ido 'I had SUBJ gone' bubiera comido 'I had ${ }_{\text {SUBJ }}$ eaten'
The other possible choices in the verbal paradigm are those that involve no modal element (that is, a zero choice in the Modal Phrase). They are the following:
(ix) [-past] [-perfective] is the present of indicative:
voy 'I go'; como 'I eat'...
(x) $\quad[-\mathrm{past}][+$ perfective $]$ is present perfect:
be ido 'I have gone'; be comido 'I have eaten'
(xi) [+past][-perfective] is the 'pretérito indefinido'
fuí'I went'; comí'I eat'
(xii) [+past][+perfective] is the 'pretérito perfecto'
bube ido 'I had gone';
bube comido 'I had eaten'
There are only two verbal forms to be accounted for in order to complete the verbal paradigm of Spanish. These are the so called imperfective pasts: cantaba and
babia cantado. Notice that the kind of imperfectivity conveyed by these forms is not incompatible with a periphrastic form construed with a participle and an auxiliary. In fact, the second one is perfective in meaning. I will claim that the morpheme distinguishing these two later forms from the ones in (xi) and (xii) is a third value of Modal, which I will call IMPF to suggest the traditional imperfective term:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \text { (xiii) [+past][[—IMPF] [-perfective]: imperfective past } \\
& \text { iba 'I was going'; comía 'I was eating' } \\
& \text { (xiv) [+past]][IMPF] [+perfective]: 'pretérito pluscuamperfecto' } \\
& \text { babía cantado 'I had sung' }
\end{aligned}
$$

If this morpheme is heading the Modal Phrase, we expect that it will be incompatible with both future and subjunctive. This prediction is borne out. There is a restriction in the presence of [IMPF] in the Modal head: it must be governed by a [+past] tense. Thus, present tense forms do not display the distinctions the past does, in opposing (xi), (xii) to (xiii), (xiv).

Under this view of Spanish Inflection, the distribution of inflectional elements is as shown in (86):
(86)


The structure of this tree is identical to the one proposed for the structure of Inflection in Basque in Laka (1988, 1991a): TP dominates a MP, which in turn dominates an AuxP, which in turn dominates an AspP, which dominates VP.

The claim that Spanish (and at least Catalan) subjunctive is an irrealis modal is further supported by uses of subjunctive other than volitional and negative contexts. I will consider here some of these.

Subjunctive mood appears within relative clauses when and only when the head of that clause is not used referentially; that is, when the DP the relative clause is part of has narrow scope. Consider the following examples:
(87) a. Compro gatos [que tengan pelo azul] 'I buy cats that have ${ }_{\text {subj }}$ blue fur'
b. Compro [gatos que tienen pelo azul] 'I buy cats that have blue fur'

In (87a), the existence of cats that have blue fur is not presupposed; that is, the DP that contains the relative clause is interpreted non-referentially, and I speak truly even if I never bought any cat. What (87a) means is that I happen to be a person that buys blue cats. However, in (87b), the existence of blue cats is presupposed, and the DP containing the relative clause is interpreted as having wide scope. For the sentence to be true, it must be the case that I have bought or am about to buy some cat or other whose fur is blue.

The hypothesis that subjuntive mood is an irrealis modal allows us to unify all environments where subjunctive appears. Volitional contexts, and clauses embedded under negative environments fall naturally together because they are all interpreted narrowly, parallel to the DPs that receive a non-referential interpretation. Relative clauses inflected for subjunctive naturally fit in the same category, because they are also interpreted narrowly. Moreover, adjunct clauses can also be inflected for subjunctive, as shown in (88):
a. Cuando nieve en Sevilla te compraré un palacio 'When it snows subj in Seville, I'll buy you a palace'
b. Cuando nieva en Sevilla dan fiesta en los colegios 'When it snows in Seville, they have holiday at school'

Once again, the difference between the temporal adjunct clauses in (88a) and (88b) has to do with modality. Whereas (88a) considers a possibility that might never take place, the sentence in (88b) reports a fact. (88a) is indeed like a conditional, whereas (88b) is a statement.

Finally, the irrealis value of subjunctive is also illustrated by sentences containing modals or adverbs that denote possibilities or wishes. These sentences are not embedded ones (unless we consider the adverbs heading them to be matrix clauses). I will assume that the adverbs heading them are sitting in the head of $\Sigma \mathrm{P}$ or CP , and that their irrealis character requires the presence of subjunctive in the clause. Some examples of these type of matrix subjunctive sentences are given in (89):
(89) a. quizá venga/*viene mañana
b. ojalá llueva/*llueve
c. así te parta/*parte un rayo!
maybe it will rain subj tomorrow will it rain ${ }_{\text {subj }}$ tomorrow! may a lighting strike subj you!

Under the hypothesis that subjunctive is a modal, all instances of subjunctive fall under a single group, and no stipulations about different kinds of subjunctives are necessary. Moreover, the evidence presented throughout this chapter shows that syntactic effects like the Subject Disjoint Reference Effect or interclausal Negative Polarity Item licensing must not be treated as inherently tied to the nature of subjunctive. Rather, these phenomena result from the properties of the various syntactic environments that select subjunctive mood: they all lack a truth value, and thus they all display the irrealis value of the modal projection in Infl.

On the other hand, assuming that distinct inflectional elements head distinct $\mathrm{X}^{\prime}$ projections, and given the status of subjunctive as a modal head, the entire Spanish verbal paradigm can be quite simply generated.

### 4.4. Imperative is a value of $\Sigma$.

There is one element of Inflection in Spanish that I have not yet discussed: the imperative. I will now argue that Imperative in Spanish is generated in $\Sigma$. This explains straightforwardly the distribution of imperative in this language, and its interaction with the other values of (Laka 1990) on the one hand, and subjunctive on the other.

It is well known that imperative mood and sentence negation are incompatible in Spanish. The following paradigm illustrates this fact:

| a. | Ven aquí | 'Come here' |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| . | *No ven aquí | not come ${ }_{\text {subj }}$ here |
| c. | No vengas aquí | 'Do not come here' |

The example in (90a) is a case of imperative mood. The ungrammatical (90b) illustrates that negation cannot coocur with a verb inflected for imperative mood. Finally, in (90c), a negative command is illustrated. The verb is now inflected for subjunctive mood, and negation can occur in the sentence.

This restriction on the coocurrence of imperative and negation is not a linguistic universal. In Basque, for instance, imperative and sentence negation do coocur in negative commands, as shown in (91):
a. jan ezazu hori eat you-imp that 'Eat that'
b. ez ezazu hori jan not aux that eat 'Do not eat that'

The same is true for French, as shown in (92). French does not require the change to subjunctive mood in negative commands:
a. Viens içi ‘Come here'
b. Ne viens pas içi 'Do not come here'

Hence, the source of the impossibility of having negation and imperative in Spanish must necessarily lie on language particular aspects of Spanish, such as the specifics of imperative and negation in this language.

The claim I will put forward here is that the reason why negation and imperative cannot coocur in Spanish is because they both are elements of $\Sigma$. Therefore, they are in complementary distribution. The claim is that Spanish imperative is one of the values of $\Sigma$ in this language. If this is correct, it follows not only that imperative and negation will not cooccur, but also that none of the other values of $\Sigma$ in Spanish will appear with imperative mood. We will see that this prediction is correct.

Under this hypothesis, then, the S-structure representation of an imperative sentence like (90) is as in (93):


However, in a negative command, the head of $\Sigma \mathrm{P}$ is occupied by no 'not'. Imperative cannot be generated. Subjunctive is generated in Modal, and Tense is headed by the default value [-past]. Thus the negative command is conveyed. If it is correct to think of subjunctive mood as an irrealis modal marker, it is expected that it would be required in a command that does not have imperative, given that imperative shares with the irrealis value the properties of being unrealized and modal-like.

The hypothesis that imperative is a value of $\Sigma$ accounts naturally for the contrast in (90). But, as noted before, it makes a further prediction. If imperative is a value of $\Sigma$ in Spanish, then it cannot coocur with any of the other values of that category. Let us consider the three remaining values of $\Sigma$ : the phonologically empty [NEG], the emphasizer [AFF] and the affirmative particle si. Consider first the affirmative values si and [Aff]. Take the examples in (94):
a. ven aquí
b. *sí ven aquí
c. sí, ven aquí
d. *sí vengas aquí

In (94b) sí and the imperative appear together in an ungrammatical sentence, as predicted. The case in (94c) is not a counterexample, because it is a case of complementizer sí, as discussed in Laka (1990). ${ }^{29}$ However, (94d) where sí and subjunctive coocur, as in (90c), is also ungrammatical. This indicates that sí and no differ in some fundamental way in contexts of commands.

I will assume that the ungrammaticality of (94d) is due to semantic factors: a command is unrealized and thus it cannot be affirmed, because only true statements can be affirmed. Note that in this respect affirmation and negation differ, since commands can be negated, because negation does not entail truth. If this is correct, that is, if the restriction is semantic in nature, we expect to find no languages that can have imperatives coocurring with affirmative particles. The prediction is true at least of Basque, which, as you recall, didn't have restrictions on the cooccurrence of imperative and negation:
(95) a. Etor hadi hona come do-imp here 'Come here'
b. *Bahadi etor hona yes-do-imp come here

Interestingly, sí and subjunctive can cooccur in embedded sentences, even when the embedded sentence reports a command. Examples of this are given in (96):
a. Espero que sí lo traigas
b. Me pidió que sí fuera
hope-I that yes it-bringsubjyou
'I hope that you will bring it' me-asked that yes gosubj 'She asked me to go'

The sentence in (96a) illustrates cooccurrence of si and subjunctive; the inflected verb is emphasized. The example in (96b) reports a request/command; the verb is inflected for subjunctive mood and emphasized by means of sí. This indicates that the ungrammaticality of ( $94 \mathrm{~b}, \mathrm{c}$ ) and (95) is due to its semantic ill-formedness, and not to syntactic restrictions.

[^5]The same is true of the second affirmative value of [Aff] (Laka 1990). It cannot coocur with imperative, as shown in (98), but the reason for this seems to go beyond the particulars of Spanish grammar.

$$
\begin{equation*}
\text { a. } *[\Sigma \mathrm{p} \text { aquí }] \text { ven }[\ldots \tag{98}
\end{equation*}
$$

Neither is it possible to have (99), where $\Sigma \mathrm{P}$ is headed by [Aff] and selects subjunctive mood, parallel to (94d).


Finally, let us consider the fourth value of $\Sigma$ in Spanish. This fourth element in $\Sigma P$ is the empty [ Neg ] that triggers the preposing of N -words. We have seen previously that negative values of $\Sigma$ are not semantically incompatible with imperatives. Thus, the prediction is that this element should behave similarly to overt negation: it cannot coocur with imperative, but it can be part of a negative command when followed by subjunctive. This is indeed the case, as illustrated in (100):
(100) a. Ven aquí
b. *Nunca ven aquí
c. Nunca vengas aquí
'Come here'
(do never come here)
'Do never come here'
(100a) illustrates a command inflected for imperative. (100b) has the N -word nunca fronted in $\Sigma$, and imperative inflection. The result is ungrammatical. Finally, (100c) shows the $N$-word in the specifier of $\Sigma P$, and the verb inflected for subjunctive. The sentence is now grammatical and it conveys a negative command.

The interaction between imperative and negative values of $\Sigma$ is simply accounted for under the hypothesis that imperative itself is generated in $\Sigma$ in Spanish. Furthermore, negative commands provide empirical support for the claim that subjunctive is an irrealis modal element, and that, as such, it occupies the Modal node in the Inflectional structure.

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[^0]:    (1) Klima's account is to assume that these verbs contain the syntactic feature neg. 'It will be recalled that in the discussion of inherent negatives in section 35, doubt, too, and without were assumed to contain the syntantic symbol neg. With these words, however, neg was assumed to have no phonological form; i.e., neg+doubt had the form doubt, and the verb doubt did not occur without the symbol neg+.' (Klima 1964: 313)
    (2) This asymetry has also been pointed out, independently as far as I can tell, at least in two other works besides Progovac (1988): Feldman (1985) notes the contrast for English in a footnote and Kempchinsky (1986) acknowledges also in a footnote that Jàcas notes it for Spanish.

[^1]:    (7) There is of course one difference between 'free choice' any and universals like all and every: whereas the former takes the totality of elements one by one, the latter does not necessarily do so (Vendler 1967). This difference becomes apparent in cases like (i) and (ii), which are by no means similar:
    (i) pick any card
    (ii) pick all cards

    This difference between 'free choice' any and other universal quantifiers is however not relevant for the purposes of the distinction made in the text.

[^2]:    (13) The verbs mentioned by Feldman are believe, suspect, doubt, suppose, assume, expect, assert, say, deny, imply, think, regret.

[^3]:    (14) Usually, this complementizer is referred to as -(e)la, because the initial e only surfaces in certain phonological environments. I will call it ela for simplicity. I will do the same with all other complementizers. Complementizers in Basque are morphemes attached to the inflected verb or auxiliary.

[^4]:    (24) This is in fact the view maintained by many traditional grammars, among them the Grammar of the Academy of the Spanish Language.
    (25) A similar contrast can be observed in the following pair:
    (i) Nadie niega que el vasco y las lenguas caucásicas estén emparentadas 'Noone denies that Basque and the Caucasian languages aresub related'
    (ii) Nadie niega que el vasco y las lenguas caucásicas están emparentadas 'Noone denies that Basque and the Caucasian languages are related'
    Example (i), which inflects its embedded verb with subjunctive, indicates no commitment as to whether Basque is related or not to Caucasian languages, and it simply states that there is no denial of that relation. The second sentence, inflected in indicative, entails that Basque and Caucasian languages are indeed related, thus, the state of affairs denoted by the embedded sentence in (ii) is taken to be true, whereas that is not necessarily the case in (i).

[^5]:    (29) The structure of this sentence is illustrated in (i): (i) $\left[{ }_{C P}{ }^{\text {sí }}\left[{ }_{\Sigma P} \delta\right],\left[{ }_{\Sigma P}\right.\right.$ ven ${ }_{i}\left[{ }_{I P} t_{i}\right.$ aquí] $]$

