Dilema doxastikoak: pluralismo normatiboa eta konparaezintasuna
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Argitaratua
2026-10-14
Íñigo Valero
Laburpena
Zer uste behar dugu ebidentziak norabide batean bultzatzen gaituenean eta betebehar moral edo praktikoek (adibidez, lagun bati diogun leialtasunak), berriz, kontrakoa eskatzen digutenean? Gatazka horiek, dilema doxastiko gisa ezagutzen direnek, gure bizitza intelektualaren eta moralaren arteko tentsio sakona islatzen dute. Artikulu honetan, dilema horiei buruzko bi ikuspegi nagusi aztertzen ditut: intrusio-teoriak (encroachment theories) eta Andrew Reisnerren (2008) ikuspegi mistoa (mixed view). Bi proposamen horien mugak erakutsi ondoren, pluralismo normatiboan eta konparaezintasunaren tesian oinarritutako ikuspegi bat defendatzen dut. Ikuspegi horren arabera, arrazoi epistemikoek eta ez-epistemikoek modu independentean egiten dute presio normatiboa usteen gainean, eta, zenbait kasutan, ez dago dena aintzat hartuta betebehar doxastiko bakar bat zehazterik. Horrek aukera ematen du dilema doxastikoen konplexutasuna azaltzeko, eremu normatibo desberdinen autonomia errespetatuz eta haien arteko gatazkak koordinazio artifizial batera murriztu gabe.
Aipuak nola egin
Valero, Íñigo. (2026). Dilema doxastikoak: pluralismo normatiboa eta konparaezintasuna. Gogoa. https://doi.org/10.1387/gogoa.28314
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Keywords
pluralismo normatiboa, konparaezintasuna, arrazoi epistemikoak, arrazoi pragmatikoak, epistemologia morala
References
Basu, Rima. 2019. "What we epistemically owe to each other". Philosophical Studies 176 (4): 915-931.
Basu, Rima & Schroeder, Mark. 2018. "Doxastic Wronging". In B. Kim eta M. McGrath (arg.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge. 181-205.
Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen. 2020. "Varieties of Moral Encroachment". Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1): 5-26.
Buchak, Lara. 2014. "Belief, Credence, and Norms". Philosophical Studies 169 (2): 1-27.
Crawford, Liz. 2019. "Believing the best: on doxastic partiality in friendship". Synthese 196 (4): 1575-93.
Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew. 2009. Knowledge in an uncertain world. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fritz, Kyle. 2017. "Pragmatic encroachment and moral encroachment". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1): 643-61.
Keller, Simon. 2004. "Friendship and Belief". Philosophical Papers 33 (3): 329-51.
Kelly, Thomas. 2003. "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3): 612-40.
Moss, Sarah. 2018. "Moral Encroachment". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2): 177-205.
Raz, Joseph. 1999. Practical Reason and Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Raz, Joseph. 2002. Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford: Oxford Academic, online edn.
https://doi.org/10.1093/0199248001.001.0001, accessed 13 Feb. 2026.
Reisner, Andrew. 2008. "Weighing Epistemic and Pragmatic Reasons for Belief". Philosophical Studies 138: 17-27.
Reisner, Andrew. 2023. "Welfarist Pluralism: Pluralistic Reasons for Belief and the Value of Truth". Philosophical Topics 51 (2): 53-72.
Rinard, Susanna. 2022. "Eliminating Epistemic Rationality". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1): 3-18.
Sagdahl, Mathea S. 2022. Normative Pluralism: Resolving Conflicts between Moral and Prudential Reasons. New York: Oxford University Press.
Singer, Peter. 1972. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality". Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (3): 229-43.
Stroud, Sarah. 2006. "Epistemic Partiality in Friendship". Ethics 116 (3): 498-524.
von Klemperer, Hana. 2023. "Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence". Philosophical Studies 180 2175-2190.
Basu, Rima & Schroeder, Mark. 2018. "Doxastic Wronging". In B. Kim eta M. McGrath (arg.), Pragmatic Encroachment in Epistemology. New York: Routledge. 181-205.
Bolinger, Renée Jorgensen. 2020. "Varieties of Moral Encroachment". Philosophical Perspectives 34 (1): 5-26.
Buchak, Lara. 2014. "Belief, Credence, and Norms". Philosophical Studies 169 (2): 1-27.
Crawford, Liz. 2019. "Believing the best: on doxastic partiality in friendship". Synthese 196 (4): 1575-93.
Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew. 2009. Knowledge in an uncertain world. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fritz, Kyle. 2017. "Pragmatic encroachment and moral encroachment". Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1): 643-61.
Keller, Simon. 2004. "Friendship and Belief". Philosophical Papers 33 (3): 329-51.
Kelly, Thomas. 2003. "Epistemic Rationality as Instrumental Rationality: A Critique". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (3): 612-40.
Moss, Sarah. 2018. "Moral Encroachment". Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (2): 177-205.
Raz, Joseph. 1999. Practical Reason and Norms. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Raz, Joseph. 2002. Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action. Oxford: Oxford Academic, online edn.
https://doi.org/10.1093/0199248001.001.0001, accessed 13 Feb. 2026.
Reisner, Andrew. 2008. "Weighing Epistemic and Pragmatic Reasons for Belief". Philosophical Studies 138: 17-27.
Reisner, Andrew. 2023. "Welfarist Pluralism: Pluralistic Reasons for Belief and the Value of Truth". Philosophical Topics 51 (2): 53-72.
Rinard, Susanna. 2022. "Eliminating Epistemic Rationality". Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1): 3-18.
Sagdahl, Mathea S. 2022. Normative Pluralism: Resolving Conflicts between Moral and Prudential Reasons. New York: Oxford University Press.
Singer, Peter. 1972. "Famine, Affluence, and Morality". Philosophy & Public Affairs 1 (3): 229-43.
Stroud, Sarah. 2006. "Epistemic Partiality in Friendship". Ethics 116 (3): 498-524.
von Klemperer, Hana. 2023. "Moral Encroachment, Symmetry, and Believing Against the Evidence". Philosophical Studies 180 2175-2190.
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