El derecho a decidir. Su planteamiento en el Derecho Internacional

Abstract

The right to decide is here analysed from a double perspective. First, by starting off from the analysis of the major instruments of public international law, we ee that there no legal institute of the right to decide from a legal positivist point of view. If we analyse the legal foundation for the institute of public international law that is most closely related to the right to decide, the right of peoples to selfdetermination then we can indeed detect a similarity between the two rights. This proximity takes us to the second perspective, the democratic foundation of the right to decide as a political discourse and of the right to self-determination as a positive legal right. Following Neil MacCormick, the paper calls for a new approach to understanding law that gives theoretical primacy to the norm users. Norm users constitute themselves in autonomus normative communities, political demos, which exercise and claim self-government, decision-making power and subsidiarity with a view to pursuing their idea of the «common wealth» and creating solidarity networks where they can share their popular sovereignty with other demoi. Having reached this point, the right to decide becomes an expression of participatory democracy and empowered citizens who aspire to share decsion-making spheres of justice and citizen participation following those spheres to all levels of governance where the relevant decisions are being made.