The Possibility of Coherentism and the Stringency of Ceteris Paribus Conditions

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Published Mar 17, 2015
Jonah N. Schupbach

Abstract

Schupbach (2008) puts forward a "possibility result" for Bayesian Coherentism, showing that there exist plausible sets of ceteris paribus conditions that imply that coherence is truth-conducive. Against this result, Schubert (2012) has argued that Schupbach's considered ceteris paribus conditions are "jointly inconsistent". In this article, I first show that Schubert's attempted proof of this claim is fallacious, and hence that the possibility result still stands. Next, I consider a related criticism of Schupbach's result, inspired by Olsson's (2005) constraints on ceteris paribus conditions. This leads to a general discussion of the principle(s) that should guide one in choosing such conditions.

How to Cite

Schupbach, J. N. (2015). The Possibility of Coherentism and the Stringency of Ceteris Paribus Conditions. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 30(1), 43–52. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.11725
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Keywords

Bayesianism, Ceteris Paribus Conditions, Coherence, Confirmation, Impossibility Results, Probability

Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION