John D. Norton
The replicability of experiment is routinely offered as the gold standard of evidence. I argue that it is not supported by a universal principle of replicability in inductive logic. A failure of replication may not impugn a credible experimental result; and a successful replication can fail to vindicate an incredible experimental result. Rather, employing a material approach to inductive inference, the evidential import of successful replication of an experiment is determined by the prevailing background facts. Commonly, these background facts do support successful replication as a good evidential guide and this has fostered the illusion of a deeper, exceptionless principle.
How to Cite
Norton, J. D. (2015). Replicability of Experiment. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 30(2), 229–248. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.12691
experiment, repeatability, replicability, reproducibility
Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons License.