Essence Without Fundamentality



Published 12-11-2015
Agustin Rayo


In Modality and Explanatory Reasoning, Boris Kment argues that a single notion of essence can be used to play two distinct theoretical roles. He thinks there is an important connec- tion between essence and metaphysical necessity, on the one hand, and between essence and metaphysical explanation, on the other.

In this paper I will argue that it is not clear that a single notion of essence should be used to perform both these jobs. For whereas the project of giving metaphysical explanations requires a notion of essence that distinguishes between truths that are more or less "funda- mental" in a metaphysical sense, the project of shedding light on metaphysical necessity does not. 

How to Cite

Rayo, A. (2015). Essence Without Fundamentality. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 30(3), 349–363.
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essence, fundamentality