Teorías de la referencia, filosofía experimental y calibración de intuiciones

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Published 27-02-2017
Manuel Pérez Otero

Abstract

E. Machery and some collaborators have used survey data to criticize Kripke's anti-descriptivism about proper names. I highlight a number of drawbacks in the tests of Machery et al. Some of my objections concern their ambiguity. In particular, the responses that–according to them–reveal descriptivist intuitions can be interpreted as anti-descriptivist responses (for reasons that have not been pointed out so far). Furthermore, their vignettes are inconsistent. I also discuss other issues related to the role of intuitions in philosophy; Machery et al.'s theses depends on an unjustified assumption: there is not expertise regarding intuitions.

How to Cite

Pérez Otero, M. (2017). Teorías de la referencia, filosofía experimental y calibración de intuiciones. THEORIA, 32(1), 41–62. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.15463
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Keywords

Kripke, Machery, descriptivism, expertise, proper names, cross-cultural semantics, thought experiments, empirical justification

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