Hilary Putnam on the philosophy of logic and mathematics

José Miguel Sagüillo Fernández-Vega

Abstract


I discuss Putnam's conception of logical truth as grounded in his picture of mathematical practice and ontology. i begin by comparing Putnam's 1971 Philosophy of Logic with Quine's homonymous book. Next, Putnam's changing views on modality are surveyed, moving from the modal pre-formal to the de-modalized formal characterization of logical validity. Section three suggests a complementary view of Platonism and modalism underlying different stages of a dynamic mathematical practice. The final section argues for the pervasive platonistic conception of the working mathematician.


Keywords


Putnam, Quine, Logic, Indispensability, Ontology, Scientific Language, Mathematical Practice

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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17626