Non-conceptualism, observational concepts, and the given
In "Study of Concepts", Peacocke puts forward an argument for non-conceptualism derived from the possession conditions of observational concepts. In this paper, I raise two objections to this argument. First, I argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are scenario contents, then perceptual experiences cannot present perceivers with the circumstances specified by the application conditions of observational concepts and, therefore, they cannot play the semantic and epistemic roles Peacocke wants them to play in the possession conditions of these concepts. Second, I argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are protopropositions, then Peacocke's account of the possession conditions of observational concepts falls into the Myth of the Given.
How to Cite
Castellano, F. (2018). Non-conceptualism, observational concepts, and the given. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 33(3), 401–416. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.17829
Peacocke, concept possession, scenario contents, protopropositions, the Myth of the Given
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