Epistemic structural realism, modality and laws of nature



Published 06-11-2018
Bruno Borge


According to epistemic structural realism (EER) scientific theories provide us only with knowledge about the structure of the unobservable world, but not about its nature. The most significant objection that this posi- tion has faced is the so-called Newman's problem. In this paper I offer an alternative objection to EER. I argue that its formulation leads to undesirable skeptical positions in two fields close to scientific realism: the debates on modality and laws of nature. I also show that there is an interesting sense in which my objection is stronger than the one offered by Newman.

How to Cite

Borge, B. (2018). Epistemic structural realism, modality and laws of nature. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 33(3), 447–468. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.18969
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Scientific Realism, Structural Realism, Modal Realism, Nomological Realism.