Perception as a propositional attitude



Published 25-05-2020
Daniel Kalpokas


It is widely held that the content of perceptual experience is propositional in nature. However, in a well-known article, "Is Perception a Propositional Attitude?" (2009), Crane has argued against this thesis. He therein assumes that experience has intentional content and indirectly argues that experience has non-propositional content by showing that from what he considers to be the main reasons in favour of "the propositional-attitude thesis", it does not really follow that experience has propositional content. In this paper I shall discuss Crane's arguments against the propositional-attitude thesis and will try to show, in contrast, that they are unconvincing. My conclusion will be that, despite all that Crane claims, perceptual content could after all be propositional in nature.


How to Cite

Kalpokas, D. (2020). Perception as a propositional attitude. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 35(2), 155–174.
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Crane, propositional-attitude thesis, perceptual experience, propositional content, non-propositional content, accuracy conditions.