Politics of folk psychology: Believing what others believe



Published 10-03-2021
Uku Tooming


In this paper, I argue that by attributing beliefs the attributer is pushed toward taking a stand on the content of those beliefs and that what stand they take partially depends on the relationship between the attributer and the attributee. In particular, if the attributee enjoys a higher social standing than the attributer, the latter is disposed to adopt the attributed belief, as long as certain other conditions are met. I will call this view the Adoption-by-Attribution model. Because of the non-epistemic influence that derives from the relation of inequality, belief attribution can reinforce the existing unequal power relations and contribute to epistemic injustice.

How to Cite

Tooming, U. (2021). Politics of folk psychology: Believing what others believe. THEORIA, 36(3), 361–374. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.21966
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belief, belief attribution, folk psychology, epistemic injustice, testimony