The epistemic schism of statistical mechanics



Published 13-03-2021
Javier Anta


In this paper I will argue that the two main approaches to statistical mechanics, that of Boltzmann and Gibbs, constitute two substantially different theoretical apparatuses. Particularly, I defend that this theoretical split must be philosophically understood as a separation of epistemic functions within this physical domain: while Boltzmannians are able to generate powerful explanations of thermal phenomena from molecular dynamics, Gibbsians can statistically predict observable values in a highly effective way. Therefore, statistical mechanics is a counterexample to Hempel's (1958) symmetry thesis, where the predictive capacity of a theory is directly correlated with its explanatory potential and vice versa.

How to Cite

Anta, J. (2021). The epistemic schism of statistical mechanics. THEORIA, 36(3), 399–419.
Abstract 370 | PDF Downloads 361 XML Downloads 113



Statistical Mechanics, Explanation, Prediction, Hempel, Boltzmann, Gibbs