Quantum ontology de-naturalized: What we can't learn from quantum mechanics

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Published 10-06-2024
Raoni Arroyo
Jonas R. B. Arenhart

Abstract

Philosophers of science commonly connect ontology and science, stating that these disciplines maintain a two-way relationship: on the one hand, we can extract ontology from scientific theories; on the other hand, ontology provides the realistic content of our scientific theories. In this article, we will critically examine the process of naturalizing ontology, i.e., confining the work of ontologists merely to the task of pointing out which entities certain theories commit themselves to. We will use non-relativistic quantum mechanics as a case study. We begin by distinguishing two roles for ontology: the first would be characterized by cataloging existing entities according to quantum mechanics; the second would be characterized by establishing more general ontological categories in which existing entities must be classified. We argue that only the first step is available for a naturalistic approach; the second step not being open for determination or anchoring in science. Finally, we also argue that metaphysics is still a step beyond ontology, not contained in either of the two tasks of ontology, being thus even farther from science.

How to Cite

Arroyo, R., & Arenhart, J. R. B. (2024). Quantum ontology de-naturalized: What we can’t learn from quantum mechanics. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 39(2), 193–218. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.24955
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Keywords

Ontology, Ontological naturalism, Quantum mechanics, Metaontology

Section
QUANTUM MECHANICS AND REALITY