Testimony and inferential justification

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Published 13-05-2024
Fernando Rudy Hiller

Abstract

Reductionists about testimony think that testimony is never a basic source of justification. By contrast, anti-reductionists claim that, at least in some paradigmatic cases, testimony is a basic and independent source of justification. In support of their position, anti-reductionists usually claim that paradigmatic testimony-based beliefs are non-inferential in that recipients of testimony usually don’t reason their way from the fact that they were told that p to the belief that p—they simply come to believe that p. In this paper I explore in detail the idea that paradigmatic testimony-based beliefs are non-inferentially justified and conclude that it is grounded on an overly simplistic characterization of inferential relations. Then, and taking my cue from Malmgren’s (2018) rich proposal about the varieties of inferential relations, I defend the view that paradigmatic testimony-based beliefs are inferentially justified after all.

How to Cite

Rudy Hiller, F. (2024). Testimony and inferential justification. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 39(1), 5–22. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.25029
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Keywords

testimony, inference, justification, reductionism, anti-reductionism, credibility

Section
ARTICLES