Can quasi-cyclical preferences be rational?
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Abstract
One important dimension in the work of José Luis Bermúdez concerns broadening our ideal of deliberational rationality beyond the narrow confines of standard rational decision theory. In this vein, he (2020, 2022) presents two claims: (i) there are ‘quasi-cyclical preferences’. (ii) Quasi-cyclical preferences can be rational. These claims contradict received wisdom in decision theory. I shall critically discuss both claims. In particular, I shall question whether there are quasi-cyclical preferences, and whether they can be rational. As for the latter issue, I shall consider three paradigmatic applications: time inconsistency, game theory, and discursive deadlock.
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preference, decision, rational, rational choice, action
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