From immediate perception to perceptual belief

Abstract

Pretheoretically, our senses give us immediate access to the world around us. Perceptual demonstratives (e.g. uttering “that is a bottle” while pointing at a bottle) seem to directly refer to their intended referents. Should we explain such referential directness by perceptual immediacy? Bermúdez (2000) argues that we should, and offers a powerful theory of immediate and mediate perception (Naturalized sense-datum theory) to explain how. He also argues that a different but influential theory of immediate and mediate perception (that found in traditional sense-datum theory) cannot explain referential directness by perceptual immediacy. I argue that his criticisms fail in instructive ways. Following this I assess the extent to which Bermúdez’s theory can explain a critical perceptual challenge, that of explaining the experiential similarities between perceptual experiences with varying degrees of veridicality. I argue that Bermúdez’s theory can only meet this challenge by embracing a veil of perception akin to that of his opponent – something he sought to avoid. Before concluding, I present the underlying framework of this debate devoid from any appeal to sense-datum theories. The reason is because that framework has considerable power and relevance to a number of contemporary issues in philosophy of perception.