Self-consciousness, ψ and φ

Abstract

This paper contributes to, and underpins, the project of an integrative account of psychological and bodily self-consciousness. Following a trend in the literature that uses the notion of “ownership” to discuss self-consciousness, and adapting José Luis Bermúdez’s terminology, I refer to psychological self-consciousness as “ψ-ownership” and to bodily self-consciousness as “φ-ownership.” The paper has two main aims. First, it presents a methodological framework for the study of ψ- and φ-ownership based on the framework that Bermúdez has put forward for this purpose. My framework involves three desiderata that apply mutatis mutandis to both the ψ and the φ domains. By laying out this framework, I clarify the relationship between ownership and the epistemic phenomenon of immunity to error through misidentification (both in the ψ and the φ domains), and I highlight the appeal of the notion of a phenomenology of ψ- and φ-ownership. Hence, this methodological discussion helps disclose deep similarities between the very explananda of the inquiries into ψ- and φ-ownership. Second, the paper critically examines one aspect of Bermúdez’s approach to self-consciousness, namely his explanation of bodily immunity to error in view of his defense of the phenomenology of bodily ownership. In order to articulate this criticism, I leverage the conclusions of the first half of the paper about ownership and immunity. I suggest that, despite Bermúdez’s explicit advocacy for the integrative project, his strategy at this specific point prevents him from seeing this project to completion.