Doubt and suspension: Two attitudes or one?

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Published 21-01-2025
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.26419
Benoit Guilielmo
University of Zürich
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-4224-1406

Abstract

Are doubt and suspension of judgment similar attitudes? In the burgeoning literature on suspension of judgment, the notion of doubt is curiously absent. This paper aims to argue for the plausibility of an identity claim, which I term the “No-Difference View.” This view suggests that there is no substantial difference between being in doubt and suspending judgment. The argument will draw on historical and systematic considerations that support the No-Difference View as a plausible view within the logical space of positions.

How to Cite

Guilielmo, B. (2025). Doubt and suspension: Two attitudes or one?. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 39(3), 315–331. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.26419
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Keywords

doubt, suspension of judgement, belief, epistemology, mental states

Issue
Vol. 39 No. 3 (2024)
Section
ARTICLES
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