What are metainferences?
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Abstract
In this article I propose a philosophical interpretation of metainferences, that equates them with the reasoning patterns of logicians. This is intended to solve a problem that relates metainferences as objets with metainferences as properties: if both coincide, there seems to be no interest for developping a theory of the former; but if they do not, then this theory seems useless. I claim that my proposal solves the problem, but it also undermines some of the pretended interests of metainferential logics.
How to Cite
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substructural logics, paradoxes, applied logics, philosophy of logic
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