Are proper functions normative?
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Abstract
Are proper functions normative? In this paper, I try to answer this question. Acknowledging that the notion of normativity is too ill-defined to afford a categorical yes/no answer, I proceed by attempting to identify arguments for an affirmative answer and trying to articulate what conception of normativity they rely on: what “normativity” has to be, in order for these arguments to work. I identify three arguments for the conclusion that proper functions are bearer normative, i.e., normative for the things that have the functions in question. I then propose that two of the arguments may be generalized to the agentive case, in defense of the conclusion that proper functions are also, at least in some cases, normative for agents.
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proper functions, norms, normativity, oughts, David Papineau

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