Truthmakers for Negatives

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Published 01-11-2009
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.383
Joan Pagès
Universitat de Girona

Abstract

In this paper I will first present and defend Molnar's way of setting out the problem of finding truthmakers for negative propositions. Secondly, I will reply to two objections to what in my view is the most promising general approach to the problem of negatives. Finally, I will present and defend Cheyne and Pidgen's specific proposal that falls under that general promising approach

How to Cite

Pagès, J. (2009). Truthmakers for Negatives. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 24(1), 49–61. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.383
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Keywords

metaphysics, truth, truthmakers, negative propositions, negative ontology

Issue
Vol. 24 No. 1 (2009)
Section
ARTICLES

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