Truthmakers for Negatives

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Published 01-11-2009
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.383
Joan Pagès
Universitat de Girona

Abstract

In this paper I will first present and defend Molnar's way of setting out the problem of finding truthmakers for negative propositions. Secondly, I will reply to two objections to what in my view is the most promising general approach to the problem of negatives. Finally, I will present and defend Cheyne and Pidgen's specific proposal that falls under that general promising approach

How to Cite

Pagès, J. (2009). Truthmakers for Negatives. THEORIA, 24(1), 49–61. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.383
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Keywords

metaphysics, truth, truthmakers, negative propositions, negative ontology

Issue
Vol. 24 No. 1 (2009)
Section
ARTICLES

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