Truthmakers for Negatives
##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.main##
##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.sidebar##
Published
01-11-2009
Joan Pagès
Abstract
In this paper I will first present and defend Molnar's way of setting out the problem of finding truthmakers for negative propositions. Secondly, I will reply to two objections to what in my view is the most promising general approach to the problem of negatives. Finally, I will present and defend Cheyne and Pidgen's specific proposal that falls under that general promising approach
How to Cite
Pagès, J. (2009). Truthmakers for Negatives. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 24(1), 49–61. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.383
##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.details##
Keywords
Issue
Section
Copyright Information