Is the subjective interpretation of quantum probabilities really inconsistent?
Christopher Fuchs has recently offered a provocative version of quantum mechanical realism, which is based on the suggestion that quantum probabilities merit a subjective interpretation. His proposal, however, has been charged with inconsistency by Amit Hagar (2003), who argues that interpreting quantum probabilities subjectively is inconsistent with the realist claims Fuchs wants to maintain for the quantum system and the dimensionality of the Hilbert space that accompanies it. In this paper I first outline the fundamentals of Fuchs's approach and then take up the task of rebutting Hagar's charge by demonstrating the internal coherence of Fuchs's realism.
How to Cite
Farmakis, L. (2008). Is the subjective interpretation of quantum probabilities really inconsistent? . THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 23(2), 163–173. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.393
Bayesianism, measurement problem, incompleteness of the quantum formalism, wave-function, collapse postulate, realism
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