Trust, authority and epistemic responsibility

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Gloria ORIGGI

Abstract

In this paper I argue that the epistemology of trust and testimony should take into account the pragmatics of communication in order to gain insight about the responsibilities speakers and hearers share in the epistemic access they gain through communication. Communication is a rich process of information exchange in which epistemic standards are negotiated by interlocutors. I discuss examples which show the contextual adjustment of these standards as the conversation goes on. Our sensitivity to the contextual dimension of epistemic standards make us more responsible communicators.

How to Cite

ORIGGI, G. (2008). Trust, authority and epistemic responsibility. THEORIA, 23(1), 35–44. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.4
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Keywords

trust, testimonial knowledge, communication, pragmatics of trust, epistemic responsibility.

Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION