Logical Consequence for Nominalists

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Published 01-05-2009
Marcus Rossberg Daniel Cohnitz

Abstract

It is often claimed that nominalistic programmes to reconstruct mathematics fail, since they will at some point involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist. In this paper we use an idea of Goodman and Quine to develop a nominalistically acceptable explication of logical consequence.

How to Cite

Rossberg, M., & Cohnitz, D. (2009). Logical Consequence for Nominalists. THEORIA, 24(2), 147–168. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.440
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Keywords

Philosophy of mathematics, nominalism, logical consequence, inferentialism, Nelson Goodman, W.V. Quine

Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION