Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action

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Published 19-12-2009
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.479
Josep L. Prades

Abstract

Moran's conception of self-knowledge, in his book Authority and Estrangement, is connected to an extremely rationalistic conception of intentional action. I will argue that this rationalistic commitment can be avoided without renouncing the most basic aspects in his account of self-knowledge.

How to Cite

Prades, J. L. (2009). Endorsement, Reasons and Intentional Action. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 22(1), 25–33. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.479
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Keywords

intentional action, self-knowledge, reasons, practical reasoning

Issue
Vol. 22 No. 1 (2007): On Richard Moran's _Authority and Estrangement_
Section
FORUM

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