Jesús VEGA ENCABO
In this paper, it is argued that both the informer and the hearer in a testimonial situation deserve epistemic merit insofar as they contribute to the collaborative achievement of sharing knowledge. The paper introduces a distinction between the ideals of self-sufficiency and epistemic autonomy. The autonomous exercise of our epistemic agency is very often carried out under strong conditions of epistemic dependence. Testimony exhibits a kind of social dependence that does not threaten the autonomy of the subjects that need to consider their own epistemic capacities. When involved in a testimonial situation, both speaker and hearer declare, at least implicitly, the standings they occupy in an epistemic space and are obliged to recognise certain epistemic requirements.
How to Cite
VEGA ENCABO, J. (2008). Epistemic merit, autonomy, and testimony. THEORIA, 23(1), 45–56. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.5
merit, testimony, epistemic autonomy, virtue epistemology, epistemic perspective.
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