Por qué la aposterioridad no (basta, según Kripke, ni) basta* (Why Aposteriority Is Not (Enough according to Kripke, Nor Is) Enough)

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Published 06-09-2006
Dan LÓPEZ DE SA

Abstract

Kripke famously argued that the illusion of contingency cannot be explained away, in the case of consciousness, in the way it is explained away in the rest of familiar cases of necessary aposteriori statements. In a recent paper, Pérez Otero (2002) argues that there is an alternative way of explaining it a way, in terms of mere aposteriority. I argue against the exegetical accuracy and the truth of this contention.

How to Cite

LÓPEZ DE SA, D. (2006). Por qué la aposterioridad no (basta, según Kripke, ni) basta* (Why Aposteriority Is Not (Enough according to Kripke, Nor Is) Enough) . THEORIA, 21(3), 245–255. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.519
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Keywords

aposteriority, consciousness, illusion of contingency, necessary aposteriori truths, two-dimensionalism, Saul Kripke.

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