Dan LÓPEZ DE SA
In this paper I offer a characterization of evaluative realism, present the intuitive case against it, and offer two considerations to support it further: one concerning the internalist connection between values and motivation, and the other concerning the intuitive causal inefficacy of evaluative properties. The considerations ultimately rely on the former intuitions themselves, but are not devoid of interest, as they might make one revise what one took to be his own realistic supporting intuitions, if such one had.
How to Cite
LÓPEZ DE SA, D. (2006). The Case against Evaluative Realism. THEORIA, 21(3), 277–294. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.521
evaluative realism, flexibility, metaethics, internalism, causal efficacy.
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