How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing

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Published 06-05-2006
Murali RAMACHANDRAN

Abstract

This paper puts forward necessary and suffficient conditions for knowing, and addresses Timothy Williamson's claims (a) that knowledge is an un-analyzable mental state, and (b) that any such analysis is futile. It is argued that such an account has explanatory motivation: it explains when belief fails to be knowledge.

How to Cite

RAMACHANDRAN, M. (2006). How Believing Can Fail to Be Knowing. THEORIA, 21(2), 185–194. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.537
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Keywords

knowledge, externalism, closure principle, Williamson.

Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION