Published Sep 6, 2005
Mark Steiner criticizes some remarks Wittgenstein makes about Gödel. Steiner takes Wittgenstein to be disputing a mathematical result. The paper argues that Wittgenstein does no such thing. The contrast between the realist and the demonstrativist concerning mathematical truth is examined. Wittgenstein is held to side with neither camp. Rather, his point is that a realist argument is inconclusive.
How to Cite
SAYWARD, C. (2005). Steiner versus Wittgenstein: Remarks on Differing Views of Mathematical Truth. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 20(3), 347–352. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.567
Mark Steiner, Gödel, Wittgenstein, Juliet Floyd, realism, mathematical truth, provability
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