Truth-Functional and Penumbral Intuitions

##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.main##

##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.sidebar##

PDF
Published 16-06-2010
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.635
Sergi Oms

Abstract

Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden's view with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I will present my own worries about Tappenden's account.

How to Cite

Oms, S. (2010). Truth-Functional and Penumbral Intuitions. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 25(2), 137–147. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.635
Abstract 364 | PDF Downloads 469

##plugins.themes.bootstrap3.article.details##

Keywords

Vagueness, Tappenden, Supervaluationism, essentially-vague predicates, truth-functionality, penumbral sentences

Issue
Vol. 25 No. 2 (2010): XIIth Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia
Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION

Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons License.