Truth-Functional and Penumbral Intuitions

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Published 16-06-2010
Sergi Oms

Abstract

Two of the main intuitions that underlie the phenomenon of vagueness are the truth-functional and the penumbral intuitions. After presenting and contrasting them, I will put forward Tappenden's gappy approach to vagueness (which takes into account the truth-functional intuition). I will contrast Tappenden's view with another of the theories of vagueness that see it as a semantic phenomenon: Supervaluationism (which takes into account the penumbral intuition). Then I will analyze some objections to Tappenden's approach and some objections to Supervaluationism. Finally, I will present my own worries about Tappenden's account.

How to Cite

Oms, S. (2010). Truth-Functional and Penumbral Intuitions. THEORIA, 25(2), 137–147. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.635
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Keywords

Vagueness, Tappenden, Supervaluationism, essentially-vague predicates, truth-functionality, penumbral sentences

Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION