The Consent Solution to Punishment and the Explicit Denial Objection

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Published 16-06-2010
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.636
Miroslav Imbrisevic
Heythrop College/University of London

Abstract

Recently, David Boonin has put forward several objections to Carlos S. Nino's 'Consensual Theory of Punishment'. In this paper I will defend Nino against the 'explicit denial objection'. I will discuss whether Boonin's interpretation of Nino as a tacit consent theorist is right. I will argue that the offender's consent is neither tacit nor express, but a special category of implicit consent. Further, for Nino the legal-normative consequences of an act (of crime) are 'irrevocable', i.e. one cannot (expressly and successfully) deny liability to them. I will suggest an explanation for Nino's irrevocability claim.

How to Cite

Imbrisevic, M. (2010). The Consent Solution to Punishment and the Explicit Denial Objection. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 25(2), 211–224. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.636
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Keywords

Carlos S. Nino, consensual theory of punishment, explicit denial objection, tacit consent, irrevocability

Issue
Vol. 25 No. 2 (2010): XIIth Taller d'Investigació en Filosofia
Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION

Authors retain copyright and grant the journal right of first publication with the work simultaneously licensed under a Creative Commons License.