Is There a Specific Experience of Thinking?



Published 16-06-2010
Marta Jorba


In this paper I discuss whether there is a specific experience of thinking or not. I address this question by analysing if it is possible to reduce the phenomenal character of thinking to the phenomenal character of sensory experiences. My purpose is to defend that there is a specific phenomenality for at least some thinking mental states. I present Husserl's theory of intentionality in the Logical Investigations as a way to defend this claim and I consider its assumptions. Then I present the case of understanding as a paradigmatic case for the phenomenal contrast argument and I defend it against two objections.

How to Cite

Jorba, M. (2010). Is There a Specific Experience of Thinking?. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 25(2), 187–196.
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cognitive experience, sensory experience, intentionality, phenomenal consciousness