Causation and the Agent's Point of View



Published 10-01-2014
Sebastián Álvarez


There are philosophers who deny that causal relations actually exist in nature, arguing that they are merely a product of our perspective as beings capable of intentional actions. In this paper I briefly explain this thesis and consider that it needs to be complemented with a basic non-causal ontological perspective which can account for phenomena taken as causal; I then describe what seems to be a good candidate for such an ontology and finally conclude, however, that it cannot dispense with the concept of causation and that therefore is not the kind of ontology that anti-realism about causal relations requires.

How to Cite

Álvarez, S. (2014). Causation and the Agent’s Point of View. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 29(1), 133–147.
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