The Knowability Argument and the Syntactic Type-Theoretic Approach

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Published Apr 16, 2014
Lucas Rosenblatt

Abstract

Some attempts have been made to block the Knowability Paradox and other modal paradoxes by adopting a type-theoretic framework in which knowledge and necessity are regarded as typed predicates. The main problem with this approach is that when these notions are simultaneously treated as predicates, a new kind of paradox appears. I claim that avoiding this paradox either by weakening the Knowability Principle or by introducing types for both predicates is rather messy and unattractive. I also consider the prospect of using the truth predicate to emulate other modal notions. It turns out that this idea works quite well.

How to Cite

Rosenblatt, L. (2014). The Knowability Argument and the Syntactic Type-Theoretic Approach. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 29(2), 201–221. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.7225
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Keywords

Knowability Argument – Type-theoretic approach – Self-reference – Multi-modal paradoxes – Truth

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