Singular Causation without Dispositions

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Published 24-02-2011
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.928
M. J. García-Encinas
University of Granada

Abstract

Is singular causation best understood within a dispositionalist framework? Although a positive answer has not yet been wholly developed, different philosophers have made some positive contributions suggesting that it is. Against these suggestions, I claim that any possible account of singular causation in terms of real, irreducible, dispositions conveys unsolvable flaws in its very metaphysical foundations.

How to Cite

García-Encinas, M. J. (2011). Singular Causation without Dispositions. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 26(1), 35–50. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.928
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Keywords

Causation, Dispositions, Singularism, Humeanism, Relation, Modality

Issue
Vol. 26 No. 1 (2011)
Section
ARTICLES

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