Causation: Many Words, One Thing?

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Published 20-05-2012
Lorenzo Casini

Abstract

How many notions of cause are there? The causality literature is witnessing a flourishing of pluralist positions. Here I focus on a recent debate on whether interpreting causality in terms of inferential relations commits one to semantic pluralism (Reiss, 2011) or not (Williamson, 2006). I argue that inferentialism is compatible with a `weak' form of monism, where causality is envisaged as one, vague cluster concept. I offer two arguments for this, one for vagueness, one for uniqueness. Finally, I qualify in what sense the resulting form of monism is `weak'.

How to Cite

Casini, L. (2012). Causation: Many Words, One Thing?. THEORIA, 27(2), 203–219. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.4067
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Keywords

causality, pluralism, monism, inferentialism

Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION