Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations
In this paper, I argue that moral projectivism cannot be coherently fix the content of our moral responses. To this purpose, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism and, in this context, I challenge both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.
How to Cite
CORBÍ, J. (2004). Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 19(2), 155–172. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.592
normativity, moral subjectivism, projectivism, dispositionalism, moral realism, explanation, morality.
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