Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations

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Published 06-05-2004
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.592
Josep CORBÍ

Abstract

In this paper, I argue that moral projectivism cannot be coherently fix the content of our moral responses. To this purpose, I develop a number of arguments against moral dispositionalism and, in this context, I challenge both David Lewis' dispositionalist account of colour and Chistine Korsgaard's procedural realism.

How to Cite

CORBÍ, J. (2004). Normativity, moral realism, and unmasking explanations. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 19(2), 155–172. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.592
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Keywords

normativity, moral subjectivism, projectivism, dispositionalism, moral realism, explanation, morality.

Issue
Vol. 19 No. 2 (2004): Normativity in four different angles and disciplines
Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION

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