Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to Devitt

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Edouard Machery

Abstract

In this article, I argue that philosophers' intuitions about reference are not more reliable than lay people's and that intuitions about the reference of proper names and uses of proper names provide equally good evidence for theories of reference.

How to Cite

Machery, E. (2012). Semantic Epistemology: A Brief Response to Devitt. THEORIA, 27(2), 223–227. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.6223
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Keywords

semantic epistemology, semantic intuitions, expertise, reference

Section
ARTICLES