Marcus on Belief and Belief in the Impossible

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Published 15-07-2013
Mark Richard

Abstract

I review but don't endorse Marcus' arguments that impossible beliefs are impossible. I defend her claim that belief's objects are, in some important sense, not the bearers of truth and falsity, discuss her disposition- alism about belief, and argue it's a good fit with the idea that belief's objects are Russellian states of affairs. 

How to Cite

Richard, M. (2013). Marcus on Belief and Belief in the Impossible. THEORIA, 28(3), 407–420. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.7102
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Keywords

Belief, truth, dispositionalism, Ruth Barcan Marcus, Kripke's puzzle about belief

Section
MONOGRAPHIC SECTION