La estructura corporativa española a través del análisis de consejerías cruzadas

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Publicado 18-09-2018
Carlos Sicilia José M. Sallan Pep Simo

Resumen

El objetivo de este trabajo es determinar en qué medida las presiones de la globalización han cambiado los modelos que siguen las redes corporativas españolas desde el capitalismo continental hacia hipotéticos modelos anglosajones. Para ello se analiza la red española de consejerías cruzadas, comparando la estructura actual (2012) con la de 1993 y 2006. Se muestra cómo, a pesar de que la estructura corporativa española continúa mostrando características de las economías continentales, algunos de los principales bancos están reduciendo significativamente su actividad industrial. No obstante, las entidades financieras siguen manteniendo una estrecha relación con sectores como la construcción y los servicios. El análisis de la red muestra un retroceso en la actividad de la banca industrial en España. De hecho, dos de las entidades financieras españolas más importantes, BSCH y La Caixa, continuaban llevando actividades de banca industrial en 2006, pero esta actividad se reduce significativamente en 2012. De acuerdo con las teorías sobre el papel de las consejerías cruzadas, las empresas de estos sectores tratan de asegurar su acceso al crédito bancario mediante la incorporación de asesores de las entidades financieras a su consejo de administración. Finalmente, no podemos concluir que la estructura de la red de las empresas españolas se haya convertido totalmente en un modelo de estructura anglosajón, pero tenemos indicios que lentamente los bancos parece que van abandonando posiciones de centralidad. Esto es especialmente relevante si comparamos las redes de 2006 y 2012, que muestran un descenso continuo de la centralidad de los bancos y compañías de seguros.

Cómo citar

Sicilia, C., Sallan, J. M., & Simo, P. (2018). La estructura corporativa española a través del análisis de consejerías cruzadas. Cuadernos De Gestión, 16(1), 63–84. https://doi.org/10.5295/cdg.120336ps
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Keywords

Consejerías cruzadas, gobierno corporativo, estructura corporativa, España, control bancario

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