An Austrian Idea of Dignity

A Legal-Philosophical Assessment of Surrogacy from the Standpoint of Praxeology

Abstract

This article examines surrogacy from a legal-philosophical perspective, specifically focused on the dignity of the gestational mother. It does so in light of the anthropological and ethical assumptions underlying praxeology, or the science of human action, as developed by the Austrian School of Economics. The article argues that, from this perspective, not only is freely agreed surrogacy compatible with the dignity of the gestational mother, but that its legal prohibition may itself be deemed undignified in relation to her. It analyzes and rejects the alleged analogy between this practice and slavery or organ trade. Moreover, it scrutinizes the three main arguments typically advanced against surrogacy on the grounds of its supposed indignity for the gestational mother: that such a transaction objectifies, instrumentalizes, and/or commodifies her; the inhumanity of the commitment to relinquish her child; and the claim that, given the situation of need in which she often gives her consent, this consent cannot—or should not—be regarded as valid.